- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be upvoted or downvoted separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself.
- Do not quote from Less Wrong itself, HPMoR, Eliezer Yudkowsky, or Robin Hanson. If you'd like to revive an old quote from one of those sources, please do so here.
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
- Provide sufficient information (URL, title, date, page number, etc.) to enable a reader to find the place where you read the quote, or its original source if available. Do not quote with only a name.
I'm pretty strongly cribbing off the end of So8res's MMEU rejection. Part of what I got from that chunk is that precisely quantifying utilons may be noncomputable, and even if not is currently intractable, but that doesn't matter. We know that we almost certainly will not and possibly cannot actually be offered a precise bet in utilons, but in principle that doesn't change the appropriate response, if we were to be offered one.
So there is definitely higher potential for regret with the second bet, since losing a bunch when I could otherwise have gained a bunch, and that would reduce my utility for that case, but for the statement 'you will receive -90 utilons' to be true, it would have to include the consideration of my regret. So I should not add additional compensation for the regret; it's factored into the problem statement.
Which boils down to me being unintuitively indifferent, with even the slight uncomfortable feeling of being indifferent when intuition says I shouldn't be factored into the calculations.
That makes it somewhat of a angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin issue, doesn't it?
I am not convinced that utilons automagically include everything -- it seems to me they wouldn't be consistent between different bets in that case (and, of course, each person has his own personal utilons which are not directly comparable to anyone else's).