Just out of curiosity: How (if at all) is this related to your LW post about a year ago?

I think surely the following has to be wrong:

if you never experience a timeline in which you've permanently died, then the only timelines you experience are the ones in which you have sufficient resources to survive; thus implying that whatever resources you have are going to be sufficient to survive.

because you can't get that kind of information about the future ("are going to be sufficient") just from the fact that you haven't died in the past.

As for the more central issue:

If you buy a lottery ticket, and /win/, then via Bayesian inference from the previous paragraphs, you have just collected evidence which suggests an increased likelihood that you are about to face a disaster which requires a great deal of resources to survive.

this also seems terribly wrong to me, at least if the situation I'm supposed to imagine is that I bought a lottery ticket just for fun, or out of habit, or something like that. Because surely the possible worlds that get more likely according to your quantum-immortality argument are ones in which I bought a lottery ticket in the expectation of a disaster. Further, I don't see how winning makes this situation any more likely, at least until the disaster has actually occurred and been surmounted with the help of your winnings.

Imagine 10^12 equal-probability versions of you. 10^6 of them anticipate situations that desperately require wealth and buy lottery tickets. Another 10^9 versions of you buy lottery tickets just for fun. Then one of the 10^6, and 10^3 of the 10^9, win the lottery. OK, so now your odds (conditional on having just bought a lottery ticket) of being about to face wealth-requiring danger are only 10^3:1 instead of 10^6:1 as they were before -- but you need to conditionalize on all the relevant evidence. Let's suppose that you can predict those terrible dangers half the time when they occur; so there are another 10^6 of you facing that situation without knowing it; 10^3 of them bought lottery tickets, and 10^-3 of them won. So conditional on having just bought a lottery ticket for fun, your odds of being in danger are still 10^6:1 (10^9 out of danger, 10^3 in); conditional on having just bought a lottery ticket for fun and won, they're still 10^6:1 (10^3 out of danger, 10^-3 in).

Perhaps I'm missing something important; I've never found the idea of "quantum immortality" compelling, and I think the modes of thought that make it compelling involve wrongheadedness about probability and QM, but maybe I'm the one who's wrongheaded...