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James_Miller comments on Rationality Quotes October 2014 - Less Wrong
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An official Army War College publication, 1923
While reverse stupidity isn't intelligence, learning how others rationalize failure can help us recognize our own mistakes.
Edited to reflect hydkyll's comment.
How do you know it's a German Army War College publication? Reasons for my doubt:
"Ellis Bata" doesn't sound at all like a German name.
There was no War College in Germany in 1923. There were some remains of the Prussian Military Academy, but the Treaty of Versailles forbid work being done there. The academy wasn't reactivated until 1935.
The academy in Prussia isn't usually called "Army War College". However, there are such academies in Japan, India and the US.
The link is from Strategy Page. I have listened to a lot of their podcasts and greatly respect them.
But the link doesn't say it was from a German Army War College publication. It just says "In an official Army War College publication". All hydkyll's reasons for thinking it likely to be from another country seem strong to me.
You are right, I added "German" for clarity because I assumed it was true given the context then forgot I had done this. Sorry.
This is a common failure mode, where the risk analysis is ignored completely. Falling in love with a perfect plan happens all the time in industry. Premortem analysis was not a thing back then, and is exceedingly rare still.
The context in with the sentence stands is that around that time there was the believe that the Germany army counted on being supported by other German institutions and those institutions didn't support the army but failed the army.
This is commonly known as the stab-in-the-back myth. "Myth" as the winners of WWII wrote our history books. There nothing inherently irrational about that sentiment even though it might have been wrong.
It's not about blaming the troops. If something seems so stupid that it doesn't make sense to you, it might be that the problem is on your own end.
I read the quote to mean that it's silly to claim that a plan is perfect when it's actually unworkable.
This is my interpretation, similar to a teacher saying he gave a great lecture that his students were not smart enough to understand.
Given German thought at the time I find that unlikely.
The author could have written: "We lost the war because Jews, Social Democrats and Communists backstepped us and not because we didn't have a good plan to fight two sides at once." He isn't that direct, but it's still the most reasonable reading for someone who writes that sentence in 1923 at a military academy in Germany.
I don't think I said what I meant, which is that the quote is a good example of irrational thinking.
ChristianKI's point is that this quote is a good example of coded language (aka dogwhistle) and while it looks irrational on the surface, it's likely that it means "That those plans failed was not due to any unsoundness on the part of the plans, but rather due to the fact that we were betrayed".
Or it could be read ironically. It would be hard for anyone to disagree with it without looking bad, allowing the writer to say what he really thought (as in Atheism Conquered)
Of note, Alfred von Schlieffen, the architect of the original deployment plan for war against France, was on record as recommending a negotiated peace in the event that the German Army fail to quickly draw the French into a decisive battle. Obviously, this recommendation was not followed. Also of note, Schlieffen's plan was explicitly for a one-front war; the bit with the Russians was hastily tacked on by Schlieffen's successors at the General Staff.
No plans were made for a war even one year long (although highly placed individuals had their doubts and are now widely quoted about it). No German (or other) plans which existed at the start of WW1 were relevant to the way the war ended many years later. Conversely, whatever accusations were made about betrayal in the later years of the war were clearly irrelevant to the way those plans played out in 1914 when all Germans were united behind the war effort, including Socialists.
While you're right, this all happened after Bismarck and the pre-WWI German government had put a lot of effort into avoiding a two-front war because they did not share the General Staff's optimism about being able to handle it. So this constitutes failing to admit losing a very high stakes bet, and does seem inherently irrational.
My impression is that the German military was never optimistic concerning winning vs England, France, and Russia. Those that claimed WWI was deliberately initiated by Germany, however, had to falsely claim that the German military was optimistic.
Is it plausible that the German politicians ignored the German military?
It's theoretically plausible, but from my understanding of WWI once the Russians mobilized the Germans justifiably believed that they either had to fight a two front war or allow the Russians to get into a position that would have made it extremely easy for Russia+France to conquer Germany.
Right. The 'Blank Check' was the major German diplomatic screwup. Once the Austro-Hungarian Empire issued its ultimatum, they were utterly stuck.
Agreed, although German further diplomatic errors contributed to England going against them. What they should have done is offer to let England take possession of the German fleet in return for England not fighting Germany and protecting Germany's trade routes.
Ummmmm. That seems rather drastic, and would go over like something that doesn't go over.
Indeed. A more plausible alternative strategy for Germany would be to forget the invading Belgium plan, fight defensively on the western front, and concentrate their efforts against Russia at the beginning. Britain didn't enter the war until the violation of Belgian neutrality. Admittedly, over time French diplomats might have found some other way to get Britain into the war, but Britain was at least initially unenthusiastic about getting involved, so I think Miller is on the right track in thinking Germany's best hope was to look for ways to keep Britain out indefinitely.