I would limit this to cases where the dependency involves trusting an agent's judgment (or honesty). I am not very good at figuring such a thing out and in cases like this whether I trust the agent has a large impact on the final decision.

But in this case, advocates for veganism are not being agents in the sense of implementing good/bad outcomes if you choose correctly/incorrectly, or personally gaining from you making one choice or another. Rather, we are just stating an argument and letting you judge how persuasive you think that argument is.

You can name an arbitrary figure for what the likelihood is that animals suffer, said arbitrary figure being tailored to be small yet large enough that multiplying it by the number of animals I eat leads to the conclusion that eating them is bad.

The probability that non-human animals suffer can't be arbitrarily large (since it's trivially bounded by 1), and for the purposes of the pro-veganism argument it can't be arbitrarily small, as explained in my previous comment, making this argument decidedly non-Pascalian. Furthermore, I'm not picking your probability that non-human animals suffer, I'm just claiming that for any reasonable probability assignment, veganism comes out as the right thing to do. If I'm right about this, then I think that the conclusion follows, whether or not you want to call it Pascalian.