But in this case, advocates for veganism are not being agents in the sense of implementing good/bad outcomes if you choose correctly/incorrectly, or personally gaining from you making one choice or another.
Human bias serves the role of personal gain in this case. (Also, the nature of vegetarianism makes it especially prone to such bias.)
The probability that non-human animals suffer can't be arbitrarily large (since it's trivially bounded by 1),
It can be arbitrarily chosen in such a way as to always force the conclusion that eating animals is wrong. Being arbitrary enough for this purpose does not require being able to choose values greater than 1.
It can be arbitrarily chosen in such a way as to always force the conclusion that eating animals is wrong. Being arbitrary enough for this purpose does not require being able to choose values greater than 1.
You are talking as if I am setting your probability that non-human animals are wrong. I am not doing that: all that I am saying is that for any reasonable probability assignment, you get the conclusion that you shouldn't eat non-human animals or their secretions. If this is true, then eating non-human animals or their secretions is wrong.
I'm currently unconvinced either way on this matter. However, enough arguments have been raised that I think this is worth the time of every reader to think a good deal about.
http://nothingismere.com/2014/11/12/inhuman-altruism-inferential-gap-or-motivational-gap/