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TheOtherDave comments on Not for the Sake of Happiness (Alone) - Less Wrong
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Comments (94)
The hedonic scores are identical and, as far as I can tell, the outcomes are identical. The only difference is if I know about the difference - if, for instance, I'm given a choice between the two. At that point, my consideration of 2 has more hedons than my consideration of 1. Is that different from saying 2 has more utilons than 1?
Is the distinction perhaps that hedons are about now while utilons are overall?
Talking about "utilons" and "hedons" implies that there exists some X such that, by my standards, the world is better with more X in it, whether I am aware of X or not.
Given that assumption, it follows that if you add X to the world in such a way that I don't interact with it at all, it makes the world better by my standards, but it doesn't make me happier. One way of expressing that is that X produces utilons but not hedons.
I would not have considered utilons to have meaning without my ability to compare them in my utility function.
You're saying utilons can be generated without your knowledge, but hedons cannot? Does that mean utilons are a measure of reality's conformance to your utility function, while hedons are your reaction to your perception of reality's conformance to your utility function?
I'm saying that something can make the world better without affecting me, but nothing can make me happier without affecting me. That suggests to me that the set of things that can make the world better is different from the set of things that can make me happy, even if they overlap significantly.
That makes sense. I had only looked at the difference within "things that affect my choices", which is not a full representation of things. Could I reasonably say, then, that hedons are the intersection of "utilons" and "things of which I'm aware", or is there more to it?
Another way of phrasing what I think you're saying: "Utilons are where the utility function intersects with the territory, hedons are where the utility function intersects with the map."
I'm not sure how "hedons" interact with "utilons".
I'm not saying anything at all about how they interact.
I'm merely saying that they aren't the same thing.
Oh! I didn't catch that at all. I apologize.
You've made an excellent case for them not being the same. I agree.
Cool. I thought it was confusing you earlier, but perhaps I misunderstood.
It was confusing me, yes. I considered hedons exactly equivalent to utilons.
Then you made your excellent case, and now it no longer confuses me. I revised my definition of happiness from "reality matching the utility function" to "my perception of reality matching the utility function" - which it should have been from the beginning, in retrospect.
I'd still like to know if people see happiness as something other than my new definition, but you have helped me from confusion to non-confusion, at least regarding the presence of a distinction, if not the exact nature thereof.
(nods) Cool.
As for your proposed definition of happiness... hm.
I have to admit, I'm never exactly sure what people are talking about when they talk about their utility functions. Certainly, if I have a utility function, I don't know what it is. But I understand it to mean, roughly, that when comparing hypothetical states of the world Wa and Wb, I perform some computation F(W) on each state such that if F(Wa) > F(Wb), then I consider Wa more valuable than Wb.
Is that close enough to what you mean here?
And you are asserting, definitionally, that if that's true I should also expect that, if I'm fully aware of all the details of Wa and Wb, I will be happier in Wa.
Another way of saying this is that if OW is the reality that I would perceive in a world W, then my happiness in Wa is F(OWa). It simply cannot be the case, on this view, that I consider a proposed state-change in the world to be an improvement, without also being such that I would be made happier by becoming aware of that state-change actually occurring.
Am I understanding you correctly so far?
Further, if I sincerely assert about some state change that I believe it makes the world better, but it makes me less happy, it follows that I'm simply mistaken about my own internal state... either I don't actually believe it makes the world better, or it doesn't actually make me less happy, or both.
Did I get that right? Or are you making the stronger claim that I cannot in point of fact ever sincerely assert something like that?