In the single-world case, I wouldn't want to do it. That's not because I care about the single world without me per se (as in caring for the people in the world), but because I care about myself who would not exist with ~1 probability.

Here's the thing: you obviously think that you dying is a bad thing. You apparently like living. Even if the probability were 20-80 of you dying, I imagine you still wouldn't take the bet (in the single-world case) if the reward were only a few dollars, even though you would likely survive. This indicates that you care about possible futures where you don't exist - not in the sense that you care about people in those futures, but that you count those futures in your decision algorithm, and weigh them negatively. By analogy, I think you should care about branches where you die - not in the sense that you care about the welfare of the people in them, but that you should take those branches into account in your decision algorithm, and weigh them negatively.

Another reason I don't have a problem with discontinuity is that the whole problem seems only to arise when you have an infinite number of worlds, and I just don't feel like that argument is convincing.

I'm not sure what you can mean by this comment, especially "the whole problem". My arguments against discontinuity still apply even if you only have a superposition of two worlds, one with amplitude sqrt(x) and another with amplitude sqrt(1-x).

I don't think you need infinite knowledge to know whether x=0 or x>0, especially if you give some probability to higher level multiverses.

... I promise that you aren't going to be able to perform a test on a qubit that you can expect to tell you with 100% certainty that , even if you have multiple identical qubits.

You don't need to know for sure that x>0 (as you can't know anyway), but you can have 99.9% confidence that x>0 rather easily, conditional on MWI being true. As I explained, that is enough to take risks.

This wasn't my point. My point was that your preferences make huge value distinctions between universes that are almost identical (and in fact arbitrarily close to identical). Even though your value function is technically a function of the physical state of the universe, it's like it may as well not be, because arbitrary amounts of knowledge about the physical state of the universe still can't distinguish between types of universes which you value very different amounts. This intuitively seems irrational and crazy to me in and of itself, but YMMV.

If I wake up after, in my case that I laid out, that would mean that I won, as I specified I would be killed while asleep. I could even specify that the entire lotto picking, noise generation, and checking is done while I sleep, so I don't have to worry about it.

I find it highly implausible that this should make a difference for your decision algorithm. Imagine that you could extend your life in all branches by a few seconds in which you are totally blissful. I imagine that this would be a pleasant change, and therefore preferable. You can then contemplate what will happen next in your pleasant state, and if my arguments go through, this would mean that your original decision was bad. So, we have a situation where you used to prefer taking the bet to not taking the bet, but when we made the bet sweeter, you know prefer not taking the bet. This seems irrational.

That said, I don't think the question of my subjective expectation of no longer existing is well-defined, because I don't have a subjective experience if I no longer exist.

I think it is actually well-defined? Right now, even if I were told that no multiverse exists, I would be pretty sure that I would continue living, even though I wouldn't be having experiences if I were dead. I think the problem here is that you are confusing my invocation of subjective probabilities (while you're pondering what will happen next in your branch) of what will objectively happen next with a statement about subjective experiences later.

I think we do have some more fundamental disagreement about anthropics, which I don't want to argue over until I hash out my viewpoint more.

I would be interested in reading your viewpoints about anthropics, should you publish them. That being said, given that you don't take the suicide bet in the single-world case, I think that we probably don't.