hairyfigment comments on Treating anthropic selfish preferences as an extension of TDT - Less Wrong

9 Post author: Manfred 01 January 2015 12:43AM

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Comment author: Manfred 01 January 2015 07:28:14PM *  2 points [-]

this seems to neglect the prospect of someone else simulating the exact scene a bunch more times, somewhere out in time and space

This is true - and I do think the probability of this is negligible. Additional simulations of our universe wouldn't change the probabilities - you'd need the simulator to interfere in a very specific way that seems unlikely to me.

once you've cut yourself loose of Occam's Razor/Kolmogorov Complexity and started assigning probabilities as frequencies throughout a space-time continuum in which identical subjective agent-moments occur multiply

Why do those conflict at all? I feel like you may be talking about a nonstandard use of occam's razor.

long since left behind [...] the use of probability

What probability do you give the simulation hypothesis?

Comment author: hairyfigment 01 January 2015 10:52:01PM 0 points [-]

I feel like you may be talking about a nonstandard use of occam's razor.

It's the basis for a common use. However this seems pretty clearly wrong or incomplete.

I think the grandparent's argument really had more to do with "reason(ing) over limited information" vs frequencies in a possibly infinite space-time continuum. That still seems like a weak objection, given that anthropics look related to the topic of fixing Solomonoff induction.

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