I'm not sure where to start with this but, I don't think finding a conspiracy theory ridiculous is just a matter of pro-west bias, and that the correct position is "maybe it was a conspiracy theory, maybe it was just what it looks like"? You'd have to have some pretty iffy priors for that to work.
This actually raises an interesting point, although one not quite relevant to the original post:
Roughly speaking, we should expect people who live in non-Western areas to find conspiracy theories more plausible, because, well, conspiracy theories really are more likely where they live.
After the terrorist attacks at Charlie Hebdo, conspiracy theories quickly arose about who was behind the attacks.
People who are critical to the west easily swallow such theories while pro-vest people just as easily find them ridiculous.
I guess we can agree that the most rational response would be to enter a state of aporia until sufficient evidence is at hand.
Yet very few people do so. People are guided by their previous understanding of the world, when judging new information. It sounds like a fine Bayesian approach for getting through life, but for real scientific knowledge, we can't rely on *prior* reasonings (even though these might involve Bayesian reasoning). Real science works by investigating evidence.
So, how do we characterise the human tendency to jump to conclusions that have simply been supplied by their sense of normativity. Is their a previously described bias that covers this case?