For the case of UFOs, wouldn't we have to have scientific reports explaining all unexplained observations of aerial phenomena that have occured in history, before we could reasonably claim that the probability is very low?
No. One needs to simply ask which is more likely- that unexplained aerial phenomena fall into well known categories (weather events, optical illusions, airplanes, meteors, space debris, etc.) than any hypothesis which requires us to be extremely wrong about basic aspects of reality (e.g. speed of light barrier among other issues). Note that in this regard, the prior that there are even some weather events that we don't understand should still be much higher than anything involving aliens.
To use an example, if I link you to here do you think one needs a thorough investigation of what appears there? If not, how is it different?
Wow, that link truly is a grim case. There were no references to further, proper, investigations.
If all conspiracy theories were just as ill founded, obviously there wouldn't be a case.
But what has surprised me is that the quality of investigative material is actually rather good, for several conspiracy theories (not that it leads me to draw any conclusion. I really like aporia. Probably some sort of defence mechanism), with 9/11 being the most clear example.
If the investigative material is actually rather good, and way better than I initially guessed at, ...
After the terrorist attacks at Charlie Hebdo, conspiracy theories quickly arose about who was behind the attacks.
People who are critical to the west easily swallow such theories while pro-vest people just as easily find them ridiculous.
I guess we can agree that the most rational response would be to enter a state of aporia until sufficient evidence is at hand.
Yet very few people do so. People are guided by their previous understanding of the world, when judging new information. It sounds like a fine Bayesian approach for getting through life, but for real scientific knowledge, we can't rely on *prior* reasonings (even though these might involve Bayesian reasoning). Real science works by investigating evidence.
So, how do we characterise the human tendency to jump to conclusions that have simply been supplied by their sense of normativity. Is their a previously described bias that covers this case?