The implicit rule might be that you can work on getting your not-quite-there-yet stuff into being better, or you can talk about contemporary politics, but not both at the same time. Talking about contemporary politics when you don't have your stuff seriously solid and interesting already is pulling towards the bottomless sinkhole of low-quality politics discussion which there's an explicit community norm against.
(Yes, doing the stuff well right from the outset can actually be pretty hard. That's why the simpler version of rule is "no contemporary politics talk".)
After the terrorist attacks at Charlie Hebdo, conspiracy theories quickly arose about who was behind the attacks.
People who are critical to the west easily swallow such theories while pro-vest people just as easily find them ridiculous.
I guess we can agree that the most rational response would be to enter a state of aporia until sufficient evidence is at hand.
Yet very few people do so. People are guided by their previous understanding of the world, when judging new information. It sounds like a fine Bayesian approach for getting through life, but for real scientific knowledge, we can't rely on *prior* reasonings (even though these might involve Bayesian reasoning). Real science works by investigating evidence.
So, how do we characterise the human tendency to jump to conclusions that have simply been supplied by their sense of normativity. Is their a previously described bias that covers this case?