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FeepingCreature comments on [LINK] The P + epsilon Attack (Precommitment in cryptoeconomics) - Less Wrong
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Weird question: superrationally speaking, wouldn't the "correct" strategy be to switch to B with 0.49 probability? (Or with however much is needed to ensure that if everybody does this, A probably still wins)
[edit] Hm. If B wins, this strategy halves the expected payoff. So you'd have to account for the possibility of B winning accidentally. Seems to depend on the size of the player base - the larger it is, the closer you can drive your probability to 0.5? (at the limit, 0.5-e?) Not sure. I guess it depends on the size of the attacker's epsilon as well.
I'm sure there's some elegant formula here, but I have no idea what it is.
The superrational strategy is indeed to switch to B with some probability approaching 0.5 (or, if the system allows it, vote for A with 51% of one's capital and for B with 49% of it).