It's a feature of bad governments that they don't allow people to leave (e.g. North Korea, DDR, etc.).
Also, many otherwise-good governments don't allow people to enter, or at least not many.
There are many other sources of "friction" that would slow, or even negate many of the benefits cleonid expects. Language and culture might outweigh government for most people as reasons to stay versus move. Pure geographical location, for example astride a major trade route, might do likewise. Of course, a spectacularly bad government usually provides strong enough incentive to outweigh those considerations. So this is a good way to limit spectacularly bad governments, provided that you can ensure that people can escape them.
Language and culture might outweigh government for most people as reasons to stay versus move.
Certainly. Essentially, this is a problem of incentives vs. costs. At present, high costs (such as language and culture barriers) prevent a socialist from Singapore and an economic conservative from Sweden from switching places. Likewise, a liberal from Huston and a conservative from San Francisco might stay put because of insufficiently high incentives (thanks to the central government the practical difference between living in Texas and California is not th...
Historically, the evolution of government systems was mainly driven by violence, with invasions and revolutions being the principal agents of selection process. The rules of the game were predetermined by our environment - land was a limited resource, for which our ancestors had to compete, if only to ensure the survival of their descendants.
The 20th century introduced a game changer. As agricultural productivity in developed countries rose by orders of magnitude and natural population growth practically came to a halt, possessing a large territory stopped being a necessity. Countries with little arable land, ultra-high population density and no natural resources can now not only feed their population, but also achieve top living standards. These changes may open a fundamentally different route for societal evolution – one that would not be based on violence or compulsion.
A small thought experiment - imagine what would happen if central governments cede most powers to smaller territorial units:
Unfortunately, there are serious obstacles to the successful implementation of this idea:
Do you think these problems are solvable?