It's not clear that 'MWI' in the LW sense has very much content -- in particular, it's not clear that Eliezer is committed when he endorses MWI to Carroll's description above. His recognition of the mysteriousness of 'reality fluid' and his willingness to entertain ideas like mangled worlds suggests he's perfectly happy to modify QM to generate the Born probabilities, provided the modifications reflect the character of physical law better than Bohmian Mechanics and objective collapse do.
If MWI is just 'Bohmian mechanics is wrong' plus 'objective collapse is wrong' plus 'the right answer will structurally resemble our current physics', then the best articles criticizing MWI might be ones that defend Bohmian mechanics or an objective collapse theory as non-ridiculous, and argue that until we have a finished empirically adequate MWI we can't be confident it will actually turn out simpler or more-in-the-character-of-physics than BM.
EY is sold on Deutschs presentation of MWI, which presents it as a kind of plain, unvarnished interpretation ... but that isn't a fact.. Others see MWI as making posits: that the wave function is, that there is state, that there is universal state, that there is a universal basis...
Sean Carroll, physicist and proponent of Everettian Quantum Mechanics, has just posted a new article going over some of the common objections to EQM and why they are false. Of particular interest to us as rationalists:
Very reminiscent of the quantum physics sequence here! I find that this distinction between number of entities and number of postulates is something that I need to remind people of all the time.
META: This is my first post; if I have done anything wrong, or could have done something better, please tell me!