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Jiro comments on Argument Screens Off Authority - Less Wrong
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Who do you consider to be the experts and how do you know that they don't agree?
I think there's a difference between "experts agree that global warming is caused by humans" and "experts agree that global warming is caused by humans, is of severity X, and we need these particular politically convenient anti-global warming measures taken immediately".
That doesn't answer the question.
I wasn't answering the question, I was questioning the question's implication. The question was trying to imply that taking a "position on climate change" means "taking a position on whether climate change exists", not "taking a position on climate change policy".
The anti-global-warming measure most commonly advocated as needing to be done immediately (or sooner) is reduction in fossil-fuel use. So far as I can see, this isn't politically convenient for anybody.
Beyond that: sure, it's worth distinguishing between "do experts agree that AGW is real?" and "do experts agree that AGW is real and likely to produce more than a 2degC rise over the next 50 years?" and "do experts agree that we need to cut our CO2 emissions substantially if the result isn't going to cause vast amounts of suffering and expense and inconvenience and death?" and "do experts all predict exactly the same best-guess curve for temperatures over the next 50 years?" and all the other questions that one might ask.
Eliezer's original nomination of global warming as something not to try to work out on one's own was from back in 2007, and slicedtoad's claim that "experts don't agree" is from yesterday. There's been a shift, over the years, in the commonest "skeptical" position on global warming (and hence in what question we might want to ask) from "it probably isn't happening" to "well, of course it's happening, everyone knows that, but it probably isn't our fault" to "well, of course it's happening and it's our fault, everyone knows that, but it probably won't be that bad" to "well, of course it's happening, it's our fault, and it's likely to be really bad, everyone knows that, but major cuts in fossil fuel use probably aren't the best way to address it". I think we're in the middle of the transition between the last two right now. My guess is that in another 5-10 years it may have switched again to "well, of course it's happening, it's our fault, and it's likely to be really bad, and the answer would have been to cut fossil-fuel use, but it's too late now so we might as well give up" which I've actually seen (I think here on LW, but it might have been over on Hacker News or somewhere of the kind).
In 2007, a little digging suggests that the transition from "probably not happening" to "probably not our fault" was in progress, so perhaps the question to look at is "are human activities causing a non-negligible increase in global temperature?". On that question, I think it's fair to say that "experts agree".
Right now, though, the question is probably "how bad will it be if we continue with business as usual, and what should we do about it?". My impression is that to the first part the experts all give answers of the form "we don't know exactly, but here's a crude probability distribution over outcomes"[1] and their distributions overlap a lot and basically all say at least "probably pretty bad", so I'm pretty comfortable saying that "experts agree" although I might prefer to qualify it a little.
As for "what should we do about it?", I'm not sure who would even count as an expert on that. I'd guess a solid majority of climate scientists would say we ought to reduce CO2 emissions, but maybe the nearest thing we have to experts on this question would be politicians or economists or engineers or something. I wouldn't want to make any claim about whether and how far "experts agree" on this question without first making sure we're all talking about roughly the same experts.
[1] Though they don't usually put it that way, and in particular despite my language they usually don't attach actual probabilities to the outcomes.
I don't believe this is true. In particular, I would like to draw your attention to the Stern Review which came out with quite non-scary estimates for the consequences of the global warming even after its shenanigans with the discount rates.
The climate scientists are definitely NOT domain experts on "what should we do about it" and I don't see why their opinion should carry more weight than any other reasonably well-educated population group.
Some quotations from the Wikipedia page you linked to:
And (from the WP page's summary of the SR's executive summary):
I would say that (1) a permanent 5-20% reduction in global GDP sounds pretty bad, (2) a 5-6 degree increase also sounds pretty bad, (3) serious irreversible impacts on the basic elements of life, with the world's poorest suffering earliest and most, sound pretty bad, and (4) it seems that Stern agrees that these are bad since the SR recommends strong early action.
That was rather my point, and in particular I was not claiming that "their opinion should carry more weight than any other reasonably well-educated population group". (Though I think that's slightly overstated. They should be unusually well informed about what "it" is that we might want to do something about, which is useful information in deciding what to do.)
Not to restart the whole debate again, but first, let's separate handwaving (20%, "serious irreversible impacts", etc.) from specifics, and second, to quote the same Wikipedia page
That is not 2020, that is 2200. I submit that anyone who monetizes damages after 2200 is full of the brown stuff.
In general, the Stern Review tried very hard (including what I think are clearly inappropriate assumptions -- see the same discount rates) to produce a scary report to force action now... and it failed.
Originally you said: the Stern Review came out with quite non-scary estimates ("even after its shenanigans with the discount rates"). Now you're saying: the Stern Review came out with really scary estimates but that's OK because it fudged things, e.g. by using too-low discount rates.
The first, if it had been true, would have been good evidence against my statement that more or less all climate scientists say the consequences of business-as-usual would be pretty bad.
The second may be true (I haven't looked closely enough to have a confident opinion) but even if true doesn't give us good evidence that climate scientists don't think the consequences will be bad. (It might indicate that they don't think it'll be so bad, else why not present their true reasons?. Or it might indicate that they're so convinced it'll be really bad that they're prepared to fudge things to get the point across. Or it might be anywhere in between.)
No, not quite. The actual estimates from the Stern Review are non-scary. Indeed, non-scary to the degree that the authors felt the need to add some scary handwaving. But handwaving is not estimates.
Climate scientists are not domain experts in forecasting the effect of environmental change on human society.
5-6 degrees of temperature rise is scary. Economic loss equivalent to permanent 5-20% loss of global GDP is scary.
If you personally happen to be unscared by those figures, whether because you don't believe them or because they're about the fairly far future and your own discount rate is relatively high, fair enough. In that case we simply have a disagreement about what constitutes scariness.
One difficulty here is that many of the things we may reasonably care about are not readily quantified; and any description of unquantified or barely-with-difficulty-quantified things can be dismissed as handwaving.
(But some of those things have less-handwavy more-quantified counterparts in the Report itself: e.g., tens to hundreds of millions of people displaced from their homes by the middle of the century because of flooding, sea level rise, and drought; 15%-40% of land plant and animal species extinct if temperatures rise a further 2degC. Again, how scary you think those things are depends on how much you care about the future, how much you care about people far away, how much you care about biodiversity, etc., and maybe we differ on some or all of them. I find them quite scary. Note that "how scary is this?" is a separate question from "will it actually happen?" and we're discussing the former.)
I never claimed they are. I said only that climate scientists' forecasts for the consequences of anthropogenic global warming are consistently at least "pretty bad". (They are, of course, experts in forecasting what the environmental change is likely to be, which is an important part of the task of forecasting what its consequences will be.)
We probably do. In this context, "scariness" mean willingness to spend resources now for expected mitigation of potential issues in the future. My willingness is lower than the current mainstream opinion and much lower than that of environmentalists.
Handwaving is not just lack of quantification, handwaving is asserting things without adequate support.
For example, I count the phrase "including a wider range of risks and impacts could increase this to 20% of GDP or more" as pure handwaving even though it includes a number.
I don't think we're talking about "caring" in conventional sense. As I mentioned above, this is really about pricing of future risks with an overlay of generational transfer issues.
Seriously? You don't understand that there's ideological opposition to fossil fuels (and to technology in general with unprincipled exceptions for such things as the anti-technology people's personal iPads) and that global warming is extremely convenient for it?
Also, one of the if not the biggest measure advocated is government regulation and taxes. Surely you can see how that is politically convenient.
It appears to me that opposition to technology as such is rare among voters and even rarer among politicians, at least in the countries whose politics I know anything about. I'm sure there are some luddites who talk up the dangers of climate change in order to attack technology, but if you're claiming that they explain a substantial fraction of what political support there is for taking action against climate change then I'll need to see some evidence.
Yes, one way to discourage fossil-fuel use is to tax it heavily, and I can see why a politician might want more revenue to play with. But I can equally see why they might want to be seen not to favour high taxes; all else being equal, most voters prefer to be taxed less. If I imagine a Machiavellian politician thinking "I'll advocate higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then X will happen, and then I'll be more powerful / more likely to be elected / richer / ...", I'm having trouble thinking of any really credible X.
It goes the other way around: They advocate taxing fossil fuels because they are generally in favor of government regulation.
How do you know?
Same way you do. You imagined a Machiavellan politician; well, I imagined another one.
I have to ask: Do you seriously think you are making a rational argument at this point? (Or have you, e.g., decided I'm an idiot not worth engaging with in actual rational discussion? Because if so, you could just say so.)
It makes no sense to answer my question "How do you know?" with "Same way you do" because I am not claiming to know anything about politicians' motivations here, and you are.
When you imagine your Machiavellian politician, does your imagination provide you with something that plays the role of X for mine? Or does your imagined politician simply want more regulation as a terminal value, regulation purely for the sake of regulation? If the latter, what reason is there to think that the number of such politicians is not tiny?
I don't expect a politician to literally want more regulation sa a terminal goal. However, I expect a politician to have terminal goals, such as doing better in the bureaucracy, signalling power to other politicians, etc. which more regulation helps him achieve. Bureaucracies given a chance to expand to encompass more regulation will take it.
The terminal value is power. Regulation is an intermediate instrumental goal.
No, you did not. A Machiavellan politician wants to stay in power, that is, to be elected. You're asserting a group interest that does not exist. We observe that politicians are happy to cut taxes (for people who can benefit them) if they personally get paid as much or more than before. Why would it be otherwise? (And any long-term interest, eg power for their family, should take the state of their civilization into account.)
Having the ability to take and redistribute someone else's money provides a concentrated benefit to the one doing the taking and redistributing. Cutting taxes produces a much more diffuse benefit. Concentrated benefits lead to Machiavellian behavior much more than diffuse benefits. It is possible, of course, to have an anti-taxes lobbying group which provides a concentrated benefit, but the overall balance between concentrated and diffuse benefits is on the side of the higher taxes.
That would be a diffuse cost. The politician may care about the portion of the diffuse effectthat affects his family, but that's only a small portion of the total. If the politician makes policy based on which costs help him and his family and which ones hurt him and his family, the concentrated ones will win. The ones that affect all civilization, a small portion of which he actually cares about because it goes to his family, will lose.
I don't see why you are having trouble.
"I'll advocate higher taxes to get more revenue while saying it is to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then I will have control of of more money which I'll channel to my cronies and use to bribe voters.
The common characteristic of most politicians is that they want more power. In Western democracies having control over budget and having money to allocate is a large part of that power.
First of all, for clarity, my imaginary politician was saying "I'll advocate (higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels)" rather than "I'll advocate higher taxes) to discourage the burning of fossil fuels". That is, I wasn't meaning to presuppose that the politician's real purpose was as stated.
OK, so if this sort of thing is (say) 50% of why those politicians who say we should take action to reduce or mitigate anthropomorphic climate change, then we should expect that (if politicians are perfectly Machiavellian and totally indifferent to what's true and what's beneficial) 50% of politicians who say that either are closely associated with "green energy" companies and the like, or else represent voters a substantial fraction of whom stand to benefit from "green energy" initiatives. If politicians are actually less than perfectly Machiavellian, and temper their pursuit of self-interest with occasional consideration of what would actually be best for their country and what the evidence actually says, then that figure of 50% needs to be correspondingly higher.
We should also, if politicians are that Machiavellian, expect to find that any politician who, e.g., represents a substantial number of voters who could be bribed in this way will advocate action against climate change.
I haven't looked at the statistics, so my opinion isn't worth much at present, but I don't get the impression that things are anywhere near so clear-cut. Do you have data?
Just out of curiosity: What is your opinion about the motivation of politicians who say we shouldn't take much action against anthropogenic climate change? If we discount the stated opinions of politicians on both sides, and of lobbyists for, e.g., solar panel fitters and oil companies, what opinions do you expect to find remaining?
It seems to me that this sort of argument constitutes a fully general justification for ignoring what politicians say. Which, actually, sounds on the whole like a pretty good idea.
Things, of course, are not clear-cut at all because in reality you have a very complex network of incentives, counter-incentives, PR considerations, estimates and mis-estimates, the traditional bungling, etc. etc.
The same :-)
Well, the whole spectrum from "this is bollocks!" to "humanity's survival is at stake!", but probably dominated by "I dunno" :-D
I doubt anyone was advocating this position seriously. More likely they were pointing out the logical implications of taking the alarmist position, with its ever shifting timeline for when disaster happens, seriously.
I remember when the alarmist position was that it would happen in 20 years. Come to think of it, that was roughly 20 years ago.
That is not the impression I remember getting, but since I don't even remember where I saw this you shouldn't trust my memory much.
Here is an IPCC report from 20 years ago. (Warning: large PDF file.) It predicted a 2 degC rise, relative to a baseline in 1990, by 2100.
The report mentions that its predecessor in 1990 gave a more pessimistic best estimate. Here is that report. (Warning: large PDF file.) Its best estimate (with much uncertainty stated) was about 0.3 degC per decade "during the next century"; according to that estimate, 2 degC of warming would take about 70 years.
So, please, whose alarmist position was that there would be 2degC of rise in the next 20 years, and why should we care?
(Thanks for the ~20 downvotes, by the way. You're a real pleasure to talk to.)