James_Miller comments on Resolving the Fermi Paradox: New Directions - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (58)
I was assuming Solonomoff Induction over the full space of computable universes, which is a more principled take on fine tuning and selection effects. We should expect to find ourselves in the universe described by the simplest theory (TOE) which explains our observations.
Paperclip maximizers are a specific absurdity with probability near zero, and I find that discussing them sucks insight out of the discussion.
This full set is infinite, complex, and irrelevant - for all we know much of this space could have life radically different than our own. It is more productive to focus on the subset of the multiverse with physics like ours - compatible with our observations. In other words - we are hardly a random observer sampled from the full set of 'sentient life'.
Interstellar travel does look pretty hard, but not hard enough to prevent slow colonization. For this argument to apply to our section of the multiverse, it would need to involve new unknown physics. This is one possibility - but it seems low probability compared to other options as discussed in my post.
But then they are destroyed. I didn't describe this in my post, but from an observational selection effect, it is crucial to consider the effect of deep simulations. The universes that produce lots of deep simulations with sentient observers will tend to swamp out all other possibilities, such as those where civilizations arise but do not produce deep simulations.
The models I discussed in my post all tend to produce enormous amounts of computation applied to deep simulation - which creates enormous numbers of observers such as ourselves and vastly outweighs universes where civilizations are destroyed.
Right - we don't live in that kind of universe.
Strongly disagree, and in general it's dangerous to dismiss an argument by asserting that it's stupid and that merely discussing it is bad.
How can you be so sure of this?
Presumably there is some level of resolution at which changes to the fundamental constants no longer have appreciable effects. Maybe it's the thousandth decimal place; maybe it's the googolth decimal place; but it seems extremely unlikely to me that there isn't such a level. Given this assumption, the set of possible laws is clearly infinite.
Doesn't this all imply that the set of meaningfully different laws is finite? Also, what if there is a smallest possible level of resolution?
You are aiming at meaningfully distinct. nbouscal is aiming at the functionally equivalent.
It doesn't, because the reals are infinite in two ways: any given interval is infinite, but the number of intervals is also infinite.
Also this only applies to changing the constants but keeping the general structure the same; you can also create further laws by changing the structure of the laws itself. There are a lot of degrees of freedom.