I guess what you mean is something along the lines of if we are used to "X is natural" used as an argument to "X is true", then we assume it is meant so every time we hear it,even when it is not the case? But I think for that to happen, first the fallacy must be commited often enough to become used to it? If nobody ever used "X is natural" in the sense of "X is good", why would we jump to this implication?
My point is, the implicature is rather social, usually, perhaps if you figure out a really unusual implicature, you will not really assume people making it. You will assume so when you have heard it so often that you got used to it. An example is that capitalism-is-bad carries the implicature of socialism-is-good. The only reason it carries it is simply the frequency of it, for it is most often socialists who criticize capitalism.
In other words, the whole thing may not be much more than a frequency based prediction: people probably mean what they most often mean.
An example is that capitalism-is-bad carries the implicature of socialism-is-good. The only reason it carries it is simply the frequency of it, for it is most often socialists who criticize capitalism.
I don't think that's the only reason. It's also the desire to box every political position into boxes.
I'm reading Thinking, Fast and Slow. In appendix B I came across the following comment. Emphasis mine:
My first thought on seeing this is: holy crap, this explains why people insist on seeing relevance claims in my statements that I didn't put there. If the brain doesn't distinguish statement from implicature, and my conversational partner believes that A implies B when I don't, then of course I'm going to be continually running into situations where people model me as saying and believing B when I actually only said A. At a minimum this will happen any time I discuss any question of seemingly-morally-relevant fact with someone who hasn't trained themselves to make the is-ought distinction. Which is most people.
The next thought my brain jumped to: This process might explain the failure to make the is-ought distinction in the first place. That seems like much more of a leap, though. I looked up the Clark and Clark cite. Unfortunately it's a fairly long book that I'm not entirely sure I want to wade through. Has anyone else read it? Can someone offer more details about exactly what findings Kahneman is referencing?