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Houshalter comments on Is Determinism A Special Case Of Randomness? - Less Wrong
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Alternatively randomness could be a special case of determinism. Imagine a deterministic universe that branches into two different universes each time someone in the universe flips a coin. In one branch the coin lands head and the other it lands tails. To the people living inside the universe it would appear like a fundamentally random process, but in fact the universe is entirely deterministic.
In any case this doesn't have anything to do with free will. If you let a random number generator make your decisions for you, that's not free will.
Any "fundamentally" random process can be seen as a deterministic process. Since it will have a single outcome, we can set it as the only outcome possible, and yield a fully deterministic process which is indistinguishable from the original, random, process. In other words, we can say that a fundamentally random process is a deterministic process which relies on hidden variables which are unreachable for us.
Yes but what determines the state of the hidden variables?
We can't say. They are hidden; all our hypotheses about them would be unfalsifiable. Moreover, the fundamentally random and hidden variables viewpoints are indistinguishable by experiment, so choosing one is a matter of convenience, not absolute truth.
I'm not asking if the hypothesis is testable which is a different matter. Obviously it's impossible to distinguish pseudo-randomness from randomness, if it's done properly. But what you are suggesting is that even if it is random, it can still be thought of as a deterministic process with seemingly random but fixed hidden variables.
I'm asking how that is different than true randomness. A hidden variable in a causal graph, that itself has no cause, is for all intents and purposes "random". In fact that's probably how I would formally define randomness if I had to.
If some simple deterministic algorithm is setting all these hidden variables that's a different hypothesis. But if they have no cause, and you have all these variables which can have totally arbitrary values for no reason, then that's randomness.
I don't really think it matters which is why I don't care that it's a testable hypothesis. But for some people like OP believe it's really important which is how this issue came up.
Hidden variables aren't random; they are fixed, but unknown. Maybe we are using different definitions of randomness here. Yet I can't see why you are comfortable with a hidden deterministic algorithm setting hidden variables; wouldn't such an algorithm itself be random by your definition?
There is no point in arguing, which of the hypotheses producing the same results is "really true". We should just pick the simplest one according to the Occam razor. But the simplest hypothesis isn't just the one which involves less objects (like hidden variables), but rather, the one for which our theories fit with minimal stretch. If you agree with the interpretation of probabilities as a measure of uncertainty, then it's simpler to use the fundamentally random processes interpretation which fits into this framework -- the one with hidden variables.
I just don't see any distinction between a hidden variable and a random variable. That it's fixed has nothing to do with anything. It's the difference between having a random number generator inside your program, or having a deterministic program which is called with a bunch of randomly generated arguments.
Either way you still have to ask the question of where the numbers are coming from, and if they are truly random. If they are the result of some simple deterministic algorithm. If we could, at least in principle, predict it with total accuracy, or if it's impossible to predict no matter how much computational power we have.
And I do think there is a practical consequence of it. As you mention, Occam's razor favor's simpler hypotheses. If your hypothesis has a huge number of variables that can have arbitrary values, it has far more complexity than a hypothesis that allows for a random number generator.
Would you agree then that probability doesn't exist because it is just the product of us not reaching those hidden variables, but if we could reach them then everything would be certain?
If so, t seems that probability, like free will and time, is also an illusion.
Probability is in the mind.
Or maybe not
Quantum uncertainty and indeterminism? I've never heard these terms, but this weekend at Yosemite I met a guy from Sweden who had come here to get his PhD in physics, and he made some comment along the lines of the movement of waterfalls not being predictable/explainable by physics... so is a waterfall an example of quantum uncertainty or indeterminism? If not, what are some examples?
The typical examples are things like radioactive decay, although there are many others.
And, may I repeat, it is a myth that the some barrier prevents quantum indetermimism having macroscopic consequences. If it did, particle physics could not be an experimental science.
Note that fundamentally random processes viewpoint and hidden variables viewpoint are equivalent -- they produce the same predictions -- so choosing one is the matter of convenience.
And hidden variables viewpoint is convenient exactly because it allows to think that probabilities is in the mind, that is, probabilities are nothing but a measure of uncertainty. It eliminates the only special case -- fundamentally random processes, thus allowing us to apply our uncertainty-measure concept everywhere. Fundamentally random processes are processes which rely on parameters for which we (fundamentally) can't reduce our uncertainty, and that's it.
So yes, I would agree.
Thx for the complete answer I like your thinking process!
I agree that they are equivalent in that they denote a lack of understanding of the underlying mechanics, but in the case of randomness, even though it could be an illusion, I still subjectively (naive view) favor the existence of randomness (and probability) in the base physical mechanics because I fail to see a connection between certainty and our brain's apparent non-bound decision making.
Nevertheless I am open to the option that physics is only deterministic and that such a process may recreate our consciousness (I have to think more about that though).
As others already mentioned, introducing fundamental randomness doesn't help in resolving free will problem -- whether or not physical processes are truly random, you have no control over them.
You may want to read LW free will sequence.
Opinions vary. Naturalistic libertarianism is a thing.
Which is why discussions of fundamental indetermimism in QM always involve hidden variables. Proponents of fundamental indetermimism are invoking Occams razor.
OTOH, you can never have certain evidence that a given law is deterministic, only that it holds in t99%, .or 99.9%of cases.
That doesn't get rid of randomness, it pushes it into the observer.
My connection between randomness and free will is that I think free will wouldn't be possible in a deterministic system since everything happens as a consequence of previous events rather than as a consequence decision making.
I think that in the two branch universes above it is still random on which side the heads or tails would fall therefore it still seems random together or forked.
I don't understand the distinction between "consequence of previous events" and "consequence of decision making". If your decisions aren't a consequence of previous events, then they are just meaningless randomness.
Your decisions should ideally be as correlated as possible with your values and with the information you have. The more random your actions, the less likely they are to result in anything desirable.
And randomness is very distinct from the old concept of free will. Randomness is not your will. You have no control over it. Rather it controls you.
Consequence of previous events: when things pass from state to state as a consequence of a causal chain of actions that are not initiated or continued by a living decision maker that purposely provoked them.
Consequence of decision making: when a living being acted on a chain of physical events and modified them according to its will and therefore the pattern of the sequence is not consistent with random mechanical events.
I agree with the idea that living things make decision based on the observation of reality and must not initiate actions out of nowhere.
When I mention free will on my OP I am not referring to the ideological concept,but just my personal opinion that decision making in our brains must obey to some randomness in order to be free of regular certainty in physics.
I don't think that randomness is in our brains,I think there must be randomness in the mechanics of physics.
What makes you think that decision making in our brains is free of "regular certainty in physics"? Deterministic systems such as weather patterns can be unpredictable enough.
To be fair, if there's some butterfly-effect nonsense going on where the exact position of a single neuron ends up determining your decision, that's not too different from randomness in the mechanics of physics. But I hope that when I make important decisions, the outcome is stable enough that it wouldn't be influenced by either of those.
People are not as random as you may think they are. You can test your own randomness here.
There is no need for true randomness to create random seeming behavior. Famous example is the weather. Even totally deterministic simulations of the weather are chaotic. Even slight changes to the initial conditions will result in totally different outcomes. Or in cryptography hashing functions, which generate random and irreversible strings from an input.
There are a number of examples of this covered in the book A New Kind of Science, but you can only view a few pages online for free without using incognito mode.
I think my possible argumentative error is:
P1: I observe free will in the behavior of living things.
P2: Deterministic physical mechanical processes don't permit free will.
C: Therefore physics must include random processes.
I think I only see a solution of free will in randomness, but maybe there are other solutions ( I will read the Free Will Sequence here on LW!)
P1 is wrong because it's impossible to observe free will. If free will equals randomness, and randomness is indistinguishable from non randomness for all practical purposes, then it's impossible to know if you live in a universe with free will or not.
However defining free will as randomness is really weird, which is what I tried to argue above. If randomness is determining your actions, that's not your will, and the result is meaningless. You don't gain any useful information by watching a coin flip.
I agree, both P1 and P2 are false because free will is unobservable to begin with.
This post and the exchanges with you and others have helped me advance my thinking a lot about these issues.
I am reading the Free Will Sequence too.
How can you know the best way of fulfilling your values if you don't experiment?
Is unpredictability never a value in itself?
People are horrible at being random even when they try. Test yourself here: http://www.loper-os.org/bad-at-entropy/manmach.html
What is decision-making but a physical process occurring in your brain? Consider reading Thou Art Physics.
Eliezer wrote:
I agree that decision making is a physical process occurring in our brain, but I think that by calling it "physical" we are also implying that there is certainty in the mechanics of that process and that its just that we can't yet reach it or explain it.
What I was trying to say when I wrote "determinism is a special case of randomness" is that there must be non-certain processes in physics and that would explain, in my mind, why we can make arbitrary decisions that seem to change the determinate course of physical processes.
And what makes you think our decisions are "arbitrary", and in need of explanation?
Thx for the good question!
I think that my observation of the existence arbitrary decisions is that as living things we interrupt randomness and cause things to behave in ways that are not the product of free physical mechanics, but the product of what is going on in our minds.
Here we come back to the "what goes on in our minds is also the product of physical processes" argument, and I agree, only that it seems not determined, but "decided".
The fact that I use the word "seems" confirms that it might be an illusion too.
Presumably, he means we can make decisions in the absence of obvious decision theoretic procedures, or strongly weighted evidence, rather than getting stuck like Burridans Ass.
Right, but that's not a reason to question determinism.
No, its a reason to think tthat not all decision making is prima facie deterministic.
The evidence for indetermimism is something else.
Not obviously deterministic, no. But deterministic at the bottom level? Almost certainly.
Please don't bring up QM. Let's leave the physics to the physicists. (Also, that wasn't my original point. Regardless of whether determinism actually holds, attacking determinism to support naive free will is poorly motivated.)
The bottom level is quantum.
I am a physicist , and my views on free will arent naive.
Since when was "physical" a synonym for "deterministic"
Name one non-deterministic macroscopic process that affects objects on the scale of neurons.
Any process critically dependent on its starting conditions = chaos.
Any microscopic event triggered by a device capable of measuring quantum levels events, eg a bomb hooked up to a geiger counter.
Typical stochastic devices, such as dice.
The brain doesn't do this, so how is this relevant to free will?
Dice are deterministic. Chaotic behavior != indeterminism.
I assume they are using the "physics is deterministic" assumption when they tell me our thought process is a physical process.
My OP above questions this and I speculate that there is randomness in base physics (quantum or somewhere else, maybe at macro level too when systems cross certain levels of complexity).
Some people seem to think that incompatibilist free will is definitionally the ability to transcend physics, although voluntarists don't usually define it that way. It may be a confusions arising from the fact that if physics is determimistic, an override would be needed to get incompatibilist FW.
Thats subjective randomness being a special case of objective determinism.