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DonaldMcIntyre comments on Is Determinism A Special Case Of Randomness? - Less Wrong
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Comments (88)
Eliezer wrote:
I agree that decision making is a physical process occurring in our brain, but I think that by calling it "physical" we are also implying that there is certainty in the mechanics of that process and that its just that we can't yet reach it or explain it.
What I was trying to say when I wrote "determinism is a special case of randomness" is that there must be non-certain processes in physics and that would explain, in my mind, why we can make arbitrary decisions that seem to change the determinate course of physical processes.
And what makes you think our decisions are "arbitrary", and in need of explanation?
Thx for the good question!
I think that my observation of the existence arbitrary decisions is that as living things we interrupt randomness and cause things to behave in ways that are not the product of free physical mechanics, but the product of what is going on in our minds.
Here we come back to the "what goes on in our minds is also the product of physical processes" argument, and I agree, only that it seems not determined, but "decided".
The fact that I use the word "seems" confirms that it might be an illusion too.
Presumably, he means we can make decisions in the absence of obvious decision theoretic procedures, or strongly weighted evidence, rather than getting stuck like Burridans Ass.
Right, but that's not a reason to question determinism.
No, its a reason to think tthat not all decision making is prima facie deterministic.
The evidence for indetermimism is something else.
Not obviously deterministic, no. But deterministic at the bottom level? Almost certainly.
Please don't bring up QM. Let's leave the physics to the physicists. (Also, that wasn't my original point. Regardless of whether determinism actually holds, attacking determinism to support naive free will is poorly motivated.)
The bottom level is quantum.
I am a physicist , and my views on free will arent naive.
You're a physicist? In what field?
EDIT: Also, I was calling the OP's view of free will naive, not yours.
I agree my view is naive, but from the standpoint of knowledge of the matter since I am not a scientist and I am new to rationality overall.
I am not naive in the sense that I support free will just for the sake of it, for political or idealistic reasons. Personally I prefer the truth rather than a "feel good" moment.
I am very open to learn and discuss these issues and I hope LessWrong is a good place for this.
No problem! Also, just in case you didn't know and thought I was criticizing you for not knowing enough: "naive" has a special meaning around here; it basically means a viewpoint based on an understanding that's no longer supported by the latest developments. For instance, many of Aristotle's views are now considered naive, although they certainly weren't back in his day!
If the bottom level is quantum, is there a space for randomness or non-causal mechanical processes?