Epictetus comments on Debunking Fallacies in the Theory of AI Motivation - Less Wrong
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You have assumed that the AI will have some separate boxed-off goal system, and so some unspecified component is needed to relate its inferred knowledge of human happiness back to the goal system.
Loosemore is assuming that the AI will be homogeneous, and then wondering how contradictory beliefs can co exist in such a system, what extra component firewalls off the contradiction,
See the problem? Both parties are making different assumptions, and assuming their assumptions are too obvioust to need stating, and stating differing conclusions that correctly follow their differing assumptions,
If efficiency can be substituted for truth, why is there so so much emphasis on truth in the advice given to human rationalists?
In order to achieve an AI that's smart enough to be dangerous , a number of currently unsolved problems will have to .be solved. That's a given.
How do you check for contradictions? It's easy enough when you have two statements that are negations of one another. It's a lot harder when you have a lot of statements that seem plausible, but there's an edge case somewhere that messes things up. If contradictions can't be efficiently found, then you have to deal with the fact that they might be there and hope that if they are, then they're bad enough to be quickly discovered. You can have some tests to try to find the obvious ones, of course.
Checking for contradictions could be easy, hard or impossible depending on the architecture. Architecture dependence is the point here.