I think point 1 is very misleading, because while most people agree with it, hypothetically a person might assign 99% chance of humanity blowing itself up before strong AI, and < 1% chance of strong AI before the year 3000. Surely even Scott Alexander will agree that this person may not want to worry about AI right now (unless we get into Pascal's mugging arguments).
I think most of the strong AI debate comes from people believing in different timelines for it. People who think strong AI is not a problem think we are very far from it (at least conceptually, but probably also in terms of time). People who worry about AI are usually pretty confident that strong AI will happen this century.
In my experience the timeline is not usually the source of disagreement. They usually don't believe that AI would want to hurt humans. That the paperclip maximizer scenario isn't likely/possible. E.g. this popular reddit thread from yesterday.
I guess that would be premise number 3 or 4, that goal alignment is a problem that needs to be solved.
(Continuing the posting of select posts from Slate Star Codex for comment here, for the reasons discussed in this thread, and as Scott Alexander gave me - and anyone else - permission to do with some exceptions.)
Scott recently wrote a post called No Time Like The Present For AI Safety Work. It makes the argument for the importance of organisations like MIRI thus, and explores the last two premises:
As always, it's worth reading the whole thing, but I'd be interested in the thoughts of the LessWrong community specifically.