At this point we must play "follow the improbability". When you imagine the tornado following you around, however you try to get away from it, I ask, "what is the mechanism of this remarkably improbable phenomenon?" It seems that the agency is being supplied by your imagination, wrapped up in the word "suppose".
More illuminating are some real examples of something following something else around.
A bumper sticker follows the car it is attached to. Wherever the car goes, there goes the bumper sticker.
Iron filings follow a magnet around.
Objects near a planet follow the planet around.
A dog follows its master around.
Here, we're looking closely at the edge of the concept of purpose, and that it may be fuzzy is of little significance, since everything is fuzzy under a sufficiently strong magnifying glass. I draw the line between purpose and no purpose between 3 and 4. One recipe for drawing the line is that purpose requires the expenditure of some source of energy to accomplish the task. Anything less and it is like a ball in a bowl: the energy with which it tries to go to the centre was supplied by the disturbance that knocked it away. You expend no energy to remain near the Earth's surface; the dog does expend energy to stay with its master.
Oh, and if you have slides or a transcript of your talk, feel free to post it here, could be interesting.
I won't know what I'm going to say until I've said it, but I'll try to do a writeup afterwards.
(Epistemic status: often discussed in bits in pieces, haven't seen it summarized in one place anywhere.)
Do you feel that your computer sometimes has a mind of its own? "I have no idea why it is doing that!" Do you feel that, the more you understand and predict someone's action, the less intelligent and more "mechanical" they appear?
My guess is that, in many cases, agency (as in, the capacity to act and make choices) is a manifestation of the observer's inability to explain and predict the agent's actions. To Omega in the Newcomb's problem humans are just automatons without a hint of agency. To a game player some NPCs appear stupid and others smart, and the more you play and the more you can predict the NPCs, the less agenty they appear to you.
Note that randomness is not the same as uncertainty, since if you can predict that someone or something behaves randomly, it is still a prediction. What I mean is more of a Knightian uncertainty, where one fails to make a useful prediction at all. Something like a tornado may appear to intentionally go after you if you fail to predict where it will be going and you have trouble escaping.
If you are a user of a computer program, and it does not behave as you expect it to, you often get a feeling of there being a hostile intelligence opposing you, occasionally resulting in an aggressive behavior toward it, usually with verbal violence, though occasionally getting physical, the way we would confront an actual enemy. On the other hand, if you are the programmer who wrote the code in question, you think of the misbehavior as bugs, not intentional hostility, and treat the code by debugging or documenting. Mostly. Sometimes I personalize especially nasty bugs.
I was told by a nurse that this is also how they are taught to treat difficult patients: you don't get upset at someone's misbehavior and instead treat them not as an agent, but more like an algorithm in need of debugging. Parents of young children are also advised to take this approach.
This seems to also apply to self-analysis, though to a lesser degree. If you know yourself well, and can predict what you would do in a specific situation, you may feel that your response is mechanistic or automatic and not agenty or intelligent. Or maybe not. I am not sure. I think if I had the capacity for full introspection, not just the surface level understanding of my thoughts and actions, I would ascribe much less agency to myself. Probably because it would cease to be a useful concept. I wonder if this generalizes to a superintelligence capable of perfect or near perfect self-reflection.
This leads us to the issue of feelings, deliberate choices, free will and ability to consent and take responsibility. These seem to be useful, if illusory, concepts for when you live among your intellectual peers and want to be treated at least as having as much agency as you ascribe to them. But this is a topic for a different post.