eli_sennesh comments on Beyond Statistics 101 - Less Wrong
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I prefer public discussions. First, I'm a computer science student who took courses in machine learning, AI, wrote theses in these areas (nothing exceptional), I enjoy books like Thinking Fast and Slow, Black Swan, Pinker, Dawkins, Dennett, Ramachandran etc. So the topics discussed here are also interesting to me. But the atmosphere seems quite closed and turning inwards.
I feel similarities to reddit's Red Pill community. Previously "ignorant" people feel the community has opened a new world to them, they lived in darkness before, but now they found the "Way" ("Bayescraft") and all this stuff is becoming an identity for them.
Sorry if it's offensive, but I feel as if many people had no success in the "real world" matters and invented a fiction where they are the heroes by having joined some great organization much higher above the general public, who are just irrational automata still living in the dark.
I dislike the heavy use of insider terminology that make communication with "outsiders" about these ideas quite hard because you get used to referring to these things by the in-group terms, so you get kind of isolated from your real-life friends as you feel "they won't understand, they'd have to read so much". When actually many of the concepts are not all that new and could be phrased in a way that the "uninitiated" can also get it.
There are too many cross references in posts and it keeps you busy with the site longer than necessary. It seems that people try to prove they know some concept by using the jargon and including links to them. Instead, I'd prefer authors who actively try to minimize the need for links and jargon.
I also find the posts quite redundant. They seem to be reiterations of the same patterns in very long prose with people's stories intertwined with the ideas, instead of striving for clarity and conciseness. Much of it feels a lot like self-help for people with derailed lives who try to engineer their life (back) to success. I may be wrong but I get a depressed vibe from reading the site too long. It may also be because there is no lighthearted humor or in-jokes or "fun" or self-irony at all. Maybe because the members are just like that in general (perhaps due to mental differences, like being on the autism spectrum, I'm not a psychiatrist).
I can see that people here are really smart and the comments are often very reasonable. And it makes me wonder why they'd regard a single person such as Yudkowsky in such high esteem as compared to established book authors or academics or industry people in these areas. I know there has been much discussion about cultishness, and I think it goes a lot deeper than surface issues. LessWrong seems to be quite isolated and distrusting towards the mainstream. Many people seem to have read stuff first from Yudkowsky, who often does not reference earlier works that basically state the same stuff, so people get the impression that all or most of the ideas in "The Sequences" come from him. I was quite disappointed several times when I found the same ideas in mainstream books. The Sequences often depict the whole outside world as dumber than it is (straw man tactics, etc).
Another thing is that discussion is often too meta (or meta-meta). There is discussion on Bayes theorem and math principles but no actual detailed, worked out stuff. Very little actual programming for example. I'd expect people to create github projects, IPython notebooks to show some examples of what they are talking about. Much of the meta-meta-discussion is very opinion-based because there is no immediate feedback about whether someone is wrong or right. It's hard to test such hypotheses. For example, in this post I would have expected an example dataset and showing how PCA can uncover something surprising. Otherwise it's just floating out there although it matches nicely with the pattern that "some math concept gave me insight that refined my rationality". I'm not sure, maybe these "rationality improvements" are sometimes illusions.
I also don't get why the rationality stuff is intermixed with friendly AI and cryonics and transhumanism. I just don't see why these belong that much together. I find them too speculative and detached from the "real world" to be the central ideas. I realize they are important, but their prevalence could also be explained as "escapism" and it promotes the discussion of untestable meta things that I mentioned above, never having to face reality. There is much talk about what evidence is but not much talk that actually presents evidence.
I needed to develop a sort of immunity against topics like acausal trade that I can't fully specify how they are wrong, but they feel wrong and are hard to translate to practical testable statements, and it just messes with my head in the wrong way.
And of course there is also that secrecy around and hiding of "certain things".
That's it. This place may just not be for me, which is fine. People can have their communities in the way they want. You just asked for elaboration.
The applicable word is metaphysics. Acausal trade is dabbling in metaphysics to "solve" a question in decision theory, which is itself mere philosophizing, and thus one has to wonder: what does Nature care for philosophies?
By the way, for the rest of your post I was going, "OH MY GOD I KNOW YOUR FEELS, MAN!" So it's not as though nobody ever thinks these things. Those of us who do just tend to, in perfect evaporative cooling fashion, go get on with our lives outside this website, being relatively ordinary science nerds.
Sorry avoiding metaphysics doesn't work. You just end up either reinventing them (badly) or using a bad 5th hand version of some old philospher's metaphysics. Incidentally, Eliezer also tried avoiding metaphysics and wound up doing the former.
Its insufficiently appreciated that physicalism is metaphysics too.
I don't like Eliezer's apparent mathematical/computational Platonism myself, but most working scientists manage to avoid metaphysical buggery by simply dealing with only those things with which what they can actually causally interact. I recall an Eliezer post on "Explain/Worship/Ignore", and would add myself that while "Explain" eventually bottoms out in the limits of our current knowledge, the correct response is to hit "Ignore" at that stage, not to drop to one's knees in Worship of a Sacred Mystery that is in fact just a limit to current evidence.
EDIT: This is also one of the reasons I enjoy being in this community: even when I disagree with someone's view (eg: Eliezer's), people here (including him) are often more productive and fun to talk to than someone who hits the limits of their scientific knowledge and just throws their hands up to the tune of "METAPHYSICS, SON!", and then joins the bloody Catholic Church, as if that solved anything.
That works up until the point where you actually have to think about what it means to "causally interact" with something. Also questions like "does something that falls into a black hole cease to exist since it's no longer possible to interact with it"?
But there are trivially easy answers to questions like that. Basically you have to ask "Cease to exist for whom?" i.e. it obviously ceases to exist for you. You just have to taboo words like "really" here such "does it really cease to exist" as they are meaningless, they don't lead to predictions. What often people consider "really" reality is the perception of a perfect god-like omniscient observer but there is no such thing.
Essentially there are just two extremes to avoid, the po-mo "nothing is real, everything is mere perception" and the traditional, classical "but how things really really REALLY are?" and the middle way here is "reality is the sum of what could be perceived in principle". A perception is right or wrong based on how much it meshes with all the other things that can in principle be perceived. Everything that cannot even be perceived in theory is not part of reality. There is no how things "really" are, the closest we have to that what is the sum of all potential, possible perceivables about a thing.
I picked up this approach from Eric S. Raymond, I think he worked it out decades before Eliezer did, possibly both working from Peirce.
This is basically anti-metaphysics.
Does this imply that only things that exist in my past light cone are real for me at any given moment?
I don't know what real-for-me means here. Everything that in principle, in theory, could be observed, is real. Most of those you didn't. This does not make them any less real.
I meant the "for whom?" not in the sense of me, you, or the barkeeper down the street. I meant it in the sense of normal beings who know only things that are in principle knowable, vs. some godlike being who can know how things really "are" regardless of whether they are knowable or not.
I'd like to congratulate you on developing your own "makes you sound insane to the man in the street" theory of metaphysics.
Man on the street needs to learn what counterfactual definiteness is.
I just need to translate that for him to street lingo.
"There is shit we know, shit we could know, and shit could not know no matter how good tech we had, we could not even know the effects it has on other stuff. So why should we say this later stuff exists? Or why should we say this does not exist? We cannot prove either."
Well, that's where it starts to break down; because what you can, in theory, observe is different from what I can, in theory, observe.
This is because, as far as anyone can tell, observations are limited by the speed of light. I cannot, even in principle, observe the 2015 Alpha Centauri until at least 2019 (if I observe it now, I am seeing light that left it around 2011). If Alpha Centauri had suddenly exploded in 2013, I have no way of observing that until at least 2018 - even in principle.
So if the barkeeper, instead of being down the street, is rather living on a planet orbiting Alpha Centauri, then the set of what he can observe in principle is not the same as the set of what I can observe in principle.