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Leonhart comments on Open Thread, Jun. 15 - Jun. 21, 2015 - Less Wrong
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By extensional definition I mean fencing off the notion of free will with a set of reasonably sharp (close to the free will/not free will boundary) examples of not having free will.
A rock not having free will is uncontroversial, but not sharp (very far from the boundary). I am looking for a set of examples where most people would agree that
It is an example of not having free will (uncontroversial)
It is hard to move it toward the "definitely free will" case without major disagreements from others (reasonably sharp).
Pretty sure I'm misparsing you somehow, but here are some things I might consider nonfree action :
A) an action is rewarded with a heroin fix; the actor is in withdrawal
B) an action will relieve extreme and urgent pain
C) an action is demanded by reflex (e.g. withdrawal from heat)
D) an action is demanded by an irresistably salient emotional appeal that the agent does not reflectively endorse (release the country-slaying neurotoxin, or I shall shoot your child)
I think these are very good examples, I would agree with C), disagree with D), require clarification on B) and have no strong opinion on A). Others might have different opinions. I further think that without amassing a wealth of examples like this and selecting a subset where there is a general agreement on which side of the fence they lie is necessary for a productive discussion of the issue.
If you intend to try again in the current open thread, feel free to transfer the examples.
Trying to clarify my intuitions re. B:
Consider Paul Atreides undergoing the gom jabbar; he will die unless he keeps his hand in the box. Given that he knows this, I count his success as a freely willed action; if (counterfactually) the pain had been sufficient to overcome him, withdrawing his hand would not have been freely willed, because it is counter to his consciously endorsed values (and, in this case, not subtle or confused values).
However, if (also counterfactually) the threat of death had not been present or known to him, then withdrawing his hand may have been a freely willed act (if the pain built slowly enough to be noticed rather than just triggering a burn-reaction).