Unknowns comments on Two-boxing, smoking and chewing gum in Medical Newcomb problems - Less Wrong

14 Post author: Caspar42 29 June 2015 10:35AM

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Comment author: Unknowns 01 July 2015 11:51:54AM *  1 point [-]

What if we take the original Newcomb, then Omega puts the million in the box, and then tells you "I have predicted with 100% certainty that you are only going to take one box, so I put the million there?"

Could you two-box in that situation, or would that take away your freedom?

If you say you could two-box in that situation, then once again the original Newcomb and the genetic Newcomb are the same.

If you say you could not, why would that be you when the genetic case would not be?

Comment author: philh 01 July 2015 01:41:21PM -1 points [-]

Unless something happens out of the blue to force my decision - in which case it's not my decision - then this situation doesn't happen. There might be people for whom Omega can predict with 100% certainty that they're going to one-box even after Omega has told them his prediction, but I'm not one of them.

(I'm assuming here that people get offered the game regardless of their decision algorithm. If Omega only makes the offer to people whom he can predict certainly, we're closer to a counterfactual mugging. At any rate, it changes the game significantly.)

Comment author: Unknowns 01 July 2015 02:03:05PM *  1 point [-]

I agree that in reality it is often impossible to predict someone's actions, if you are going to tell them your prediction. That is why it is perfectly possible that the situation where you know the gene is impossible. But in any case this is all hypothetical because the situation posed assumes you cannot know which gene you have until you choose one or both boxes, at which point you immediately know.

EDIT: You're really not getting the point, which is that the genetic Newcomb is identical to the original Newcomb in decision theoretic terms. Here you're arguing not about the decision theory issue, but whether or not the situations involved are possible in reality. If Omega can't predict with certainty when he tells his prediction, then I can equivalently say that the gene only predicts with certainty when you don't know about it. Knowing about the gene may allow you to two-box, but that is no different from saying that knowing Omega's decision before you make your choice would allow you to two-box, which it would.

Basically anything said about one case can be transformed into the other case by fairly simple transpositions. This should be obvious.

Comment author: philh 01 July 2015 02:38:22PM *  0 points [-]

Sorry, tapping out now.

EDIT: but brief reply to your edit: I'm well aware that you think they're the same, and telling me that I'm not getting the point is super unhelpful.