Eitan_Zohar comments on You are (mostly) a simulation. - Less Wrong

-4 Post author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 04:40PM

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Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 17 July 2015 07:45:20PM *  -1 points [-]

Eg, under mind-brain identity theory, my mind isnt going to jump around while I'm asleep because my brain doesn't.

I do not subscribe to brain-mind identity theory. I consider the 'pattern' which is the mind to be fundamentally different, even if it is written on the brain.

What do you mean by overlay?

Basically, that you are in all universes at once which generate your experiences. Some more than others.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 17 July 2015 08:34:13PM *  0 points [-]

Eg, under mind-brain identity theory, my mind isnt going to jump around while I'm asleep because my brain doesn't.

I do not subscribe to brain-mind identity theory. I consider the 'pattern' which is the mind to be fundamentally different, even if it is written on the brain.

If you did subscribe to mind brain identity theory, you wouldn't have to struggle to find a way of explaining why the jumping you don't predict but don't observe doesn't occur. Adopting a theory that doesn't match observation, and then bolting on more theory to solve the problem is kind of not good.

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 07:05:18AM *  -2 points [-]

If you did subscribe to mind brain identity theory, you wouldn't have to struggle to find a way of explaining why the jumping you don't predict but don't observe doesn't occur.

I can't 'observe' jumping by definition.

Adopting a theory that doesn't match observation, and then bolting on more theory to solve the problem is kind of not good.

That's not even close to what I'm doing.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 03:19:29PM *  0 points [-]

The standard worry about DT is that (from the outside) a coherent thread of consciousnes goes though a set of incoherent external world states, which, for, the inside, would look like observing chaos. You have said that what you are worried about is observing chaos, although you have also said that you have a solution to the no-physical-law problem of DT. So who knows?

ETA If you jump, but don't notice you are jumping, what is the problem.

You've also said that what you are worried about is something to do,with measure, although there is an answer to that as well...so....whatever.

That's not even close to what I'm doing.

Which is?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 04:23:40PM *  -2 points [-]

You have said that what you are worried about is observing chaos,

I do not recall saying any such thing.

although you have also said that you have a solution to the no-physical-law problem of DT. So who knows?

I really don't know what the heck you are talking about. "No-physical-law" problem? And I thought I was bad at conveying these concepts.

ETA If you jump, but don't notice you are jumping, what is the problem.

The problem is that I prefer for my subjective consciousness to stay in one world.

Which is?

An extrapolation from a single coherent theory, which you apparently think works through 'observation.'

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 06:48:52PM 0 points [-]

Why should it disobey every observed law of physics? Are you arguing that conscious observers would almost certainly experience chaos? If so I agree with you. I don't accept 'pure' Dust Theory.

Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.

ETA If you jump, but don't notice you are jumping, what is the problem.

The problem is that I prefer for my subjective consciousness to stay in one world.

Why?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:55:47PM *  -2 points [-]

Why should it disobey every observed law of physics? Are you arguing that conscious observers would almost certainly experience chaos? If so I agree with you. I don't accept 'pure' Dust Theory.

Observing chaos is the same thing as having no discernible physical laws.

I took your use of the word 'worried' to say that I was afraid this was true.

Why?

Because I subjectively value my universe and do not wish to go to another one.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 July 2015 08:13:31AM -1 points [-]

Under MWI and DT, which are not the same theory, you dont go to another universe, in the sense of leaving the old one..

Under physicalism+simulationusmism, which is not the same as the other two, you can cease to exist at one point in time, and be resurrected in a simulation millions of years later. But I don't see how staying awake would prevent that.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 July 2015 02:18:19PM -1 points [-]

extrapolation from a single coherent theory

I note that Coherent falls some way short of True or even Likely.

Comment author: Dentin 18 July 2015 07:44:00PM 0 points [-]

If you were concerned about jumping and jumping was merely 'extremely difficult to observe', that would probably be ok.

However, if you can't observe jumping by definition and are still concerned about it, that's called a 'cognitive defect', and you should fix it. Fix the cognitive defect, that is. The one in your head. The one that's making you be irrationally concerned over a defined unobservable.

No amount of handwaving, being concerned, or liking your current 'subjective reality' is going to make your unobservable observable. Fix the core problem, don't try to paper over it.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 04:33:09PM *  -2 points [-]

What do you mean by overlay?

Basically, that you are in all universes at once which generate your experiences. Some more than others.

Arguably, i would have no way of knowing whether or not I am in a supposition of identical mind states or world states, because they're identical. Why would a difference that doesn't make a difference, make a difference?

Or: what is the dirfference, if there is one?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 04:39:54PM -2 points [-]

If it's rational to prefer your perceptions to conform to an external reality, than it's rational to not want to be someone else every morning.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 18 July 2015 05:37:16PM *  1 point [-]

But is it rational to entertain theories about differences in external reality that could never make any difference to subjective or objective experience?

Comment author: Eitan_Zohar 18 July 2015 06:40:10PM *  -2 points [-]

I value other minds existing to interact with me, even if I can't perceive them directly. And I value waking up tomorrow in the same universe (more or less) that I'm in now.

Is this rational? Eliezer defines rationality as systematized winning; I'm pointing out what.

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 July 2015 08:51:55AM *  0 points [-]

Under DT, and MWI, which are not the same, you wake up in all the universes you were ever in.

ETA

You might have a concern about your measure being dominated by simulations.That isnt the same as jumping. Also, you can only be simulated if you ever had a real life, so it's possible to take the glass half full view, that the simulations are a bonus to a fully real life, not a dilution.