The horrifying importance of domain knowledge
There are some long lists of false beliefs that programmers hold. isn't because programmers are especially likely to be more wrong than anyone else, it's just that programming offers a better opportunity than most people get to find out how incomplete their model of the world is.
I'm posting about this here, not just because this information has a decent chance of being both entertaining and useful, but because LWers try to figure things out from relatively simple principles-- who knows what simplifying assumptions might be tripping us up?
The classic (and I think the first) was about names. There have been a few more lists created since then.
Time. And time zones. Crowd-sourced time errors.
Addresses. Possibly more about addresses. I haven't compared the lists.
Gender. This is so short I assume it's seriously incomplete.
Networks. Weirdly, there is no list of falsehoods programmers believe about html (or at least a fast search didn't turn anything up). Don't trust the words in the url.
Distributed computing Build systems.
Poem about character conversion.
I got started on the subject because of this about testing your code, which was posted by Andrew Ducker.
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Comments (236)
If you only do this you are going to fail. This is why Aristotle got physics so badly wrong, right? Reasoning has to be a cyclical process of compressing complex realities into sets of simple principles and only then are you licensed to decompress those principles into making statements about reality.
Addressing common misconceptions is worthwhile, and lists are a good way to do it. You can find similar lists in the academic literature for many different subjects, e.g., here's an article about common misconceptions in thermodynamics. I've also mentioned math books listing counterexamples before. Many counterexamples address common misconceptions.
I like to create Anki cards for common misconceptions, to make sure I don't makes these mistakes myself. One issue with this is whether correcting specific cases causes my brain to recognize a more general case. I'm not sure it always does, but this is better than nothing. I try to include problem solving in my daily life partly as a way to make my beliefs propagate (e.g., I could realize that something is an example of a principle I have a card for).
Edit: Also, to be pedantic, many of the problems listed in the links above would most charitably be called approximations. Programmers might make these because of laziness, for example. Calling them false beliefs could be misleading as the programmer could know something is false but not care about corner cases.
So while many of these false beliefs are worth noting, it's worth thinking why programmers make these mistakes in practice. While it might be the case that names can include numbers, it's probably also going to be the case that the majority of numbers get into names via user error. Depending on the purpose of your database, it might be more valuable to avoid user error, than avoid a minority of users being excluded.
The reason I mention this is a lot of things in life are a study in trade offs. Quantum mechanics isn't very good at describing how big things work, and classical mechanics isn't very good at describing how small things work.
From Falsehoods Programmers Believe About Names:
There should be a list of false things people coming from common law jurisdictions believe about how choice of identity works on the rest of the globe.
I'm not sure what's intended by "appropriate" there-- it might not be so much a claim about the law as a claim that it's a name the person wants to use and you shouldn't argue with them about it.
Even then, impersonation is an issue..
Sometimes a user puts something in a "name" field that they do not actually intend to be used to identify themselves.
They may be trying to get that string displayed to other users in a highlighted fashion. If someone puts "Wal-Mart Sucks" in the name field on a blog comment, it isn't because they seriously want to be identified by the surname of Sucks. They're just saying that Wal-Mart sucks, in a dramatic way.
They may be trying to break the system in one way or another. If someone puts their name as "Robert'; drop table students; --" then depending on the social and technical context they might be giving themselves a clever alias; or they might be trying to attack the database.
All fair enough.
There's also the possibility of accidentally entering wrong characters-- I assume this is unlikely since people should know how to type their names, but people have to type their names so much that even a low chance of fumble-fingers is going to occur now and then.
Or their mom might be a hacker.
Incidentally, there are many cases where I don't care about my username at all and have to come up with something. I'd find it acceptable if they'd just give me a number and a password, or let me register just with a password (perhaps provided by them?), maybe plus e-mail.
I think it's worth noting that, yes, if you want your database of names/addresses/times/etc. to be fully robust, you need to essentially represent these items as unconstrained strings of arbitrary length (including zero).
However, in practice, most likely you're not building a fully robust database. For example, you are not solving the problem of, "how can I fully represent all of the marvelous variety of human names and addresses ?", but rather, "how can I maximize the changes that the packages my company is shipping to customers will actually be shipped to the correct customer ?".
The second problem is much more heavily constrained, because your database no longer holds arbitrary pieces of information; but rather, instructions to someone (or something) at the package shipping company. All you need to do is implement just enough complexity to make sure you can communicate to that agent. It is highly unlikely that the agent will accept arbitrary strings, because he needs to turn around and convert the strings to instructions for his fleet of delivery truck drivers, and -- not being omniscient -- he can't do that if the address says, "That one old guy who lives in the village over by the river".
As a nitpick -- yes, he can. In the third world it's not uncommon to NOT have a working system of usual addresses and locations are typically specified as town -- local landmark -- directions from that local landmark.
Of course, you're much less likely to be shipping a package to those kinds of third world countries, and even if you did, you'd have trouble making sure it gets delivered to its destination for other reasons.
Right, I was thinking in the context of our Western society. But in the third world, as you said, the opposite is true: an address like "123 Main St., Sometown Somecountry" simply does not work. So it is still not the case that you need to implement a fully general address database that covers all possible cases; you only need to cover the cases that you personally care about.
A lot of programmers believe they can parse HTML with regular expressions.
A lot of programmers believe they can parse HTML at all.
Go read the official W3C parser algorithm, I'll wait. First thing you'll notice is that there is no formal grammar - the spec is of the actual parser state machine. Then you notice each past-and-present HTML version has its own parser algorithm spec, and there is no official documentation on the differences between them, never mind rationale. Then you realize that HTML5 is now a "living spec", so the parser algorithm at that link occasionally changes, and past versions and changelogs are deliberately not published...
HTML is a parseable format like PHP is a programming language. There is no spec, there is only whatever bugs and quirks a particular browser version happens to contain.
(Oh, you thought browsers actually follow any of those published W3C specs? HAHAHAHAHA sob.)
HTML is indeed a turd of a standard.
Hey, can we try not invoking the blasphemous things that dangle from the staked corpses o̭̙̥͚̘͍̠f dead universes?
If I were feeling snarky I'd add, "a lot of people believe they are programmers."
(To adapt a quotation, "Anyone can code. That doesn't mean anyone should.")
Falsehoods programmers believe about time is another in the series.
Thank you. That was there (plus some extras-- see the article now) in my original post at lj, but somehow it got lost as I was bullying the html to work here.
It also seems to amount to arguing that we should take people's delusions and hallucinations at face value, as long as those are about there gender. It's also interesting that these are the only type of delusions society is, currently, expected to play along with.
If a man shows up claiming to be both Jesus and John Lennon his beliefs won't be taken seriously and he is likely to be directed towards treatment aimed at curing him of his delusion. On the other hand, if a man shows up claiming to be a woman, we are expected to take him at his word, disregard any other evidence to the contrary, and accommodate this delusion in all kinds of unreasonable ways.
When "a man shows up claiming to be a woman", what exactly -- in "beliefs pay rent in anticipated experiences" terms -- do you think this person is wrong about? What delusions do you think they have, that you can reduce to actual experiences? (Note that "X is a man" and "X is a woman" do not satisfy that last criterion, and part of the dispute here is over how we should define those terms.)
So far as I can tell, the people in question are not under the misapprehension that they have female anatomy or female chromosomes; they don't imagine that they are considered female by other people; they know that they bear male names; etc.
Psychologically, the typical person who "shows up claiming to be Jesus" is very unlike the typical "man who shows up claiming to be a woman". A well informed person would make quite predictions in the two cases about, e.g., their general level of rationality in other domains, their propensity to make testable predictions that turn out incorrect, etc.
You are evidently suggesting that we should treat these two cases alike, but they seem to me very different.
I could ask the same question about the man who claims to be Jesus. In both cases it's possible to "steelman" the claims to be unfalsifiable if one is so inclined, although at that point the claims are unfalsifiable and have no connection to reality and are mere free floating claims.
You could ask it, but I think a correct answer would look quite different in the two cases.
I should preface this by saying that I am neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist, and will welcome corrections from those who are. So, anyway, my understanding is that if someone thinks he's Jesus then either (1) he expects to have some super-Jesus-powers like performing miracles or offering teaching so supremely wise that following it will greatly improve anyone's life[1], and/or (2) his thinking in this area is so seriously disordered that it's a bit of a stretch to say that he actually "thinks" he's Jesus as opposed to merely saying it but not really understanding what that would mean.
[1] For the avoidance of doubt, I am not claiming that the actual Jesus (assuming there was one) had those superpowers; only that those superpowers are part of what is meant by "Jesus" in the context of someone claiming to be him. In case 1, his beliefs are falsifiable and will generally be falsified. In case 2, they are unfalsifiable but this isn't much of a steelman; the point is just that he's not thinking coherently.
What about the other case? Well, here my understanding is that (1) the people in question do not have falsifiable-and-will-be-falsified beliefs; they do not, e.g., think that their anatomy is different from what it actually is. And (2) their thinking in this area may differ from (e.g.) yours but it is not incoherent and they don't in any way resemble people undergoing schizophrenic episodes.
So, first of all: Do you disagree with me about this? If so, (a) on what points and (b) how do you suggest we go about determining which of us is nearer the truth?
Now, so far what I've said about transgender people has been purely negative -- I've said "no, they don't think X and don't have problem Y". Perhaps you disagree not about that but about what you (rightly or not, we'll see) expect me to say about what they do think. So let's proceed.
The model of gender they're working with goes something like this:
Do you think something in that is delusional, on a par with thinking you're both Jesus and John Lennon? It doesn't look that way to me. (As it happens, I think this is a better account of gender than any that makes gender a matter of anatomy or genetics or biochemistry, but at present I'm not concerned with defending that claim; the only relevant point is that it isn't crazy.)
In terms of this model, it's clear enough (I think) what someone means when despite having a Y chromosome they say "I am a woman". They mean: "I am much more comfortable thinking of myself as female than as male; I wish to occupy a female role in society, to use a traditionally female name, etc.". This would make little sense if "female" meant "possessed of a uterus" or "having two X chromosomes", but (see above) that isn't what it means in this context.
*
Finally: Let us suppose that all of the above is, in some way I'm failing to see, totally wrongheaded, and that in fact there is a Right Way to determine someone's gender, and that Right Way is a matter of looking at their chromosomes or something, and that we therefore really are talking about "men claiming to be women". There remains what seems to me a pretty clear distinction between someone in that position and someone claiming to be Jesus-the-son-of-God. Namely: in almost all contexts treating someone as a woman despite their male-typical anatomy and chromosomes is easy and harmless, and empirically it makes these people much less likely to kill themselves. (And no one has yet found anything else that does.) Whereas treating someone as the Son of God probably means, e.g., worshipping them, which is a much less reasonable thing to ask others to do.
I repeat that my primary disagreement with you on this point is about whether transgender people are really much like people who think they are Jesus; the point of the previous paragraph is just that even if I'm completely wrong about that, it doesn't follow that we should adopt the position I think you are suggesting we should.
This is even more true about being a messiah or a famous rock star.
Yes, your asserting a definition that fails to cut reality at the joints (or at least is worse at it then the traditional definition) and then insisting that everyone else adopt it.
I could just as easily steelman the Jesus and John Lennon guy as saying "I am much more comfortable thinking of myself as a son of God and famous rock star than as a typical human."
Not when they insist on say playing in women's sports and using women's bathrooms.
No, empirically playing along with their delusions doesn't actually reduce their chances of killing themselves.
But not about being a specific messiah or a specific famous rock star. If everyone treats me as a messiah then I am, I suppose, a messiah in some sense. But that doesn't make me Jesus.
Would you like to justify that?
It appears to me that I am doing the exact opposite. I am describing a definition and saying I don't think it's crazy on a par with believing oneself to be the son of God. I do, as I mentioned, think it's a reasonable definition, but I also said, in so many words, that I'm not at present trying to argue that anyone else should adopt it. Only that it's not completely crazy.
So I guess when you say "you" you either don't actually mean me, or aren't troubling to distinguish between me and the people I'm describing. So let's talk about those people; people who (let's suppose) really are asking everyone to use their definition which (let's suppose) doesn't cut reality at its joints as well as some other definition (what? you haven't said; but let's say something to do with chromosomes and anatomy and hormones).
I repeat: Are you seriously saying that that is on a par with thinking you are simultaneously Jesus Christ and John Lennon? Really? Adopting one definition of gender rather than another is as crazy as believing yourself to be two long-dead famous people, one of them actually a demigod?[1]
[1] "Demigod" is of course not an accurate description of what Christians think the founder of their religion to have been, but it's near enough for our purposes.
Except that what I said isn't (so far as I am aware) steelmanning; it is what the people in question actually say. Whereas I betcha Mr Jesus Lennon would react pretty angrily to being told all he meant was that he wanted to think of himself, and be thought of by others, as a son of God and famous rock star.
That's not what I've heard. Would you be interested in telling me where your information comes from?
So would you seriously argue that Bruce Jenner is closer to the "female" cluster then the "male" cluster?
I would seriously argue that "closer to" in this context can mean multiple things. For, e.g., medical purposes Jenner is much nearer the male than the female cluster. [EDITED because I'd got things the wrong way around in the previous sentence.] For some others it's the other way around; e.g., the only pictures I've seen I would classify as nearer "typical female" than "typical male". For some others it's more complicated. For some others I simply have no idea (I have never met Jenner nor heard her[1] voice).
It seems to me that the great majority of the interactions people have with one another are ones where the impact of gender is (for those of us with the good fortune not to be hypersensitive to such things) rather small, and in those cases a definition that requires me to call a person a man even though the person in question is called Caitlyn, is wearing a dress, and plainly considers herself[1] a woman seems to me to be doing a poor job at cutting reality at its joints, and I will take the alternative even if that needs some adjustment when I am prescribing drugs for them or contemplating having sex with them.
(The real problem, of course, is that reality doesn't exactly have joints and that so far as it does we're quibbling over which side of the cut a piece of cartilage belongs on. Er, my apologies to any transgender or intersex folks reading this; I would not compare you to a piece of cartilage in other contexts!)
[1] I have attempted to phrase things so as to avoid question-begging via pronouns etc., but here I couldn't find any way that wasn't awfully clumsy. Sorry about that.
Why do you believe this to be so?
Whoops. I don't; it was a typo, which I shall fix forthwith. [EDITED to add: well, not exactly a typo, but at any rate an error caused by lower brain functions failing to obey higher.]
(In principle you could have guessed this not only because it's fairly obviously wrong but also because it was followed by an "it's the other way around" that actually went the same way around.)
Eh. In some subcultures people use that word in their own way. The more options you offer, the more people of various subcultures will be your clients.
What's the expected ROI for making all this effort to accommodate a tiny minority? And what of the ethical implications concerned with enabling what could very well be a mental illness?
How large is the investment ? Do websites need to have a gender field? Not including one would be a slight saving. It might make sense to just have an optional title field.
Knowing gender means that it's possible to use the proper pronoun. Having a lot of demographic information is also useful to understand user behavior better. You can show women different ads then men.
You could ask for preferred pronouns, and possibly take the risk of having a text field for pronouns that aren't on your list.
I have no idea whether you'd do better with ads that are targeted to preferred title and pronouns rather than to stated gender, but you might.
Regardless of whether or not you believe that e.g. trans people genuinely feel uncomfortable with their bodies for gender/identity reasons or other reasons, it seems like applying the principle of charity and taking others' claims about how they feel about their bodies at face value costs little.
That's a strawman. "How does one feel about one's body" is far away from what most people including the dictionary take as the definition of gender.
More generally do you think there little cost involved by letting a male prisoner who doesn't like to be among other male prisoners but likes to be around female prisoners to declare that he's female and then let society put him in a female prison?
So there are specific contexts in which taking people's expressed gender identity at face value would work badly. Fair enough. But as the saying goes, "hard cases make bad law"; the question "are there contexts where doing X works badly?" may be less appropriate than "in most contexts, does doing X work better than not doing X?". It could be that (1) letting allegedly transgender criminals get moved to different prisons on the basis of their "new" gender is a bad idea, but that (2) outside prison, taking allegedly transgender people at face value is generally much better than not.
Still, let's consider that example a little more carefully. It's certainly true that we would prefer not to have male criminals get themselves put in all-female prisons just by saying "I'm a woman now", because they might endanger the other inmates. So, you do two things. First, you don't let people switch gender simply by saying "I'm a ---- now". Perhaps, e.g., you (1) require an official diagnosis of gender dysphoria (this will eliminate some would-be abusers, but no doubt some will be convincing enough to pass this filter), (2) don't switch anyone into a [new gender] prison unless they've got as far as a course of hormone treatment (this will eliminate most remaining would-be abusers, I think), and (3) as I think is commonplace outside prison, you don't let them have that hormone treatment until they've lived for an extended period "as" their newly adopted gender. New name, new clothes, etc. (This is part of why #2 is an effective filter, though the effects of the hormones will be a bigger part.)
Second, you use the mechanisms that surely already exist for keeping prisoners safe from one another. For instance, surely some women are very dangerous to other women, and they are kept in solitary confinement or watched extra-carefully or something. So if, e.g., an apparently-male criminal abruptly declares "I'm a woman now" and gets through the filters above, maybe they have to put up with being treated as much more dangerous to (other) women than a typical woman in the prison they get sent to.
And of course if they do then (say) assault someone else, down comes the wrath of the law and the prison system on them, and their life thereafter is going to be really unpleasant. If they're calculating and controlled enough to convince a psychiatrist that they have a gender dysphoria they don't really have, and to put up with living as a woman and getting dosed with anti-androgens and oestrogens and whatnot, they're probably also capable of figuring out that actually harming anyone is liable not to be worth the trouble.
All things considered, I don't actually see much practical opportunity for abuse here -- and this is the example you picked.
Except similar logic applies in every case where gender actually matters, e.g., which bathroom to use, can they participate in women's sports, etc. And in all other cases, the benefits are along the lines of, the deluded person feels better if everyone plays along with his delusion.
The logic here takes the form: If we treat this person as female, then such-and-such danger arises that wouldn't if we treated them as male; here's a course of action that attempts to balance mitigating the danger to others against the interests of the person in question.
The appropriate conclusion depends on how real and how severe the danger is. (Of course it needn't be danger as such, and I take it you wouldn't claim there's danger associated with letting male-anatomy people compete in nominally-all-female sporting competitions.)
ChristianKI's example concerned people deemed enough of a threat to others to need locking up in prison. This is an unusually dangerous and (probably) unusually dishonest population. Outside that context, the balance will be different.
To transgender people "gender actually matters" much more of the time than you'd think. (How often does the state of your knee joints actually matter? If your knees are in good shape, hardly ever -- at least in that you hardly ever need to attend to it. But anyone who's had knee trouble can tell you that actually it matters all the time to them.)
I notice that you have so far declined to answer my original question: What actual false beliefs (expressed in terms of anticipated experiences) does this person have, in your opinion?
So do you support letting trans-"women" play on women's sports teams and use women's bathrooms? I notice, you avoided actually addressing the question.
In the sense that people make implicit Bayesian deductions based on peoples gender all the time, this is true. Of course, for purposes of those Bayesian deductions trans-people are much closer to their biological then their claimed gender.
That he's in the similarity cluster labeled "women" for one thing. Yes, you can steelman his position to be conpletely non-falsifiable if you want, I don't believe this is actually what most of them are claiming (as seen by the fact that they do insist on, e.g., using women's facilities, playing in women's sports, being celebrated as "female" CEO's.)
I think sports teams and sporting organizations should make their own decisions. I don't know what's actually best overall; I think transgender people are rare enough that it wouldn't make a big difference in practice to most . My guess is that the best policy for smaller informal sports teams and organizations is to let 'em in, that the best policy at the highest levels where a lot is at stake is to say women's teams/competitions are only for people who are anatomically female by some criterion or other, and in between I'm less sure but lean towards a let-'em-in policy in the absence of compelling evidence that it would do actual harm.
I think that if someone is generally presenting as female we should let them use women's bathrooms if they want to. The obvious objections to this seem to be (1) ewww (which I suggest is not an argument) and (2) that this introduces a danger to women from predatory men dressing up as women in order to sneak into their bathrooms. I find #2 unconvincing because when I try to imagine scenarios where there's an actual difference in the harm done I can't think of one that's actually plausible, and because whatever bathroom policy we adopt there are going to be trans people and they are going to need to use bathrooms, and there are obvious risks of harm from trans women trying to use men's bathrooms too.
I don't think that's clear at all. As I've said before in this discussion, what counts as "closer" depends greatly on context, and for many purposes someone who looks more or less female, presents as female, and considers themself female is "closer" to stereotypical-female than to stereotypical-male whatever is in their chromosomes or their pants.
Someone in this situation is some way from the centre of either the "women" or the "men" cluster, regardless. It seems to me that in fact there is no such thing as the similarity cluster labelled "women" because (have I mentioned this already?) there are any number of similarity clusters corresponding to different notions of similarity, and different notions of similarity are called for in different contexts.
If you pick some particular notion of similarity based on (say) gross anatomy, sex chromosomes, hormone levels, and ability to beget and/or bear children, then indeed our hypothetical person is in the "men" rather than the "women" cluster. But do you really think there's a delusion there? If you ask, say, Bruce->Caitlyn Jenner "What chromosomes do you have?", the answer might be "It's none of your business" or "Who cares?" but it won't be "XX, of course, because I'm a woman".
It seems to me that the actual difference between you and, say, Jenner is a disagreement about what notion of similarity to use. How is that a delusion on a par with thinking you're Jesus?
If the mere act of expressing that you want a different gender than the one you have changes your gender for societal purposes you are going to have a lot more "transgender" people when there are benefits to be gained.
Let me reformulate this as an argument :-D
Imagine a gym, or an athletic club. A pre-op transsexual presenting as a female shows up and you direct him/her to the women's locker room and showers. Soon after that a group of very irate (biological, conventional, mainstream, cis, heterosexual, not-quite-sexually-liberated) women show up and demand to know what someone with a dick is doing in their showers staring at their tits. Your response?
"You'd allow a lesbian in the room who is excited by staring at your tits. The correct course of action in that case is to just prohibit the staring, rather than to prohibit the person's presence in the room. Do that here too."
(Although now that I think of it that might not work because the same reasoning means they should allow ordinary men in the room too.)
"I understand that you find it upsetting, but our policy here is that trans people get to use the changing rooms corresponding to the gender they identify with. If Ms X was staring at your breasts, that was well out of order regardless of gender and I will be happy to speak to her about it and make it clear that that behaviour is unacceptable. If you are troubled by Ms X's genitals, then I can only suggest that you try to ignore them."
Maybe some of them leave and never come back, or set the lawyers on me. No one ever said that doing the right thing is guaranteed to be maximally profitable or keep you out of legal trouble.
Alternatively: "Oh, I think Ms X must have misunderstood our policy, which is actually that she should be using the women's toilets but that to avoid the kind of discomfort you're suffering -- for which I am very sorry -- our members are asked to use the changing rooms corresponding to their anatomy regardless of gender identity. I'll talk with Ms X and see that that's understood."
(The question I answered was about women's bathrooms -- where the partial nakedness is generally confined to individual cubicles -- rather than gym changing rooms where more difficult issues arise. I do, as it happens, prefer the first answer above to the second, but I think either is defensible.)
And of course the same argument goes the other way. The same pre-op trans woman turns up at the gym and you show her to the men's locker room and showers. Soon after that a lot of men come along and complain that there's a woman in their locker room staring at their dicks. (They may use a word more specific and ruder than "woman".) Now what?
The fundamental difficulty here is that gym changing facilities are designed on the assumption that people can be neatly partitioned into two groups, either of which is happy being naked around others in that group. This falls down in the presence of trans people, and doesn't cope too well with the existence of gay people. So any policy you adopt may have problems when someone of non-majority gender or sexuality turns up. The options are: close all the gyms; make them single-sex; provide changing facilities that let people isolate themselves while naked; exclude anyone whose appearance might disturb others; accept that some people are going to be disturbed from time to time. None of these is problem-free. Too bad.
It makes the women uncofortable. This is the same type of argument you're using that we should endulge the tannys' delusions and there are many more actual women than trannys (by four orders of magnitude and that's assuming current claims are taken at fase value), so do the utility calculation.
First, see my comment above about the relative numbers of the two groups. Also, the harm to trans "women" is lower since most men aren't interested at gawking at (or harrasing, etc.) fake "women". The ones who are tend to be gay, which is potentially a sepertate problem, but one that we have either way.
So is a lion with stripes painted on it a tiger?
You do realise this is an empirical question and not just a piece of attire you can where to be "pro-trans"?
This is not an argument, it's an appeal to nihilism. Yes, you can arbitarily define a set and declare it a "similarity cluster", that doesn't make it so. This is similar to the psychiatric patient I mentioned above who defined the set consisting of himself, Jesus, and John Lenon, and declared it a similarity cluster.
Not to mention physical strength, a bunch of psychological traits, etc.
Honestly, in this case there is probably less delusion and more BS (in the sense of the saying things without caring for their truth value) for the sake of getting another 15 minutes of fame.
I think you're doing the wrong calculation, in two ways.
The rate of sexual assault of trans people is very high.
I wrote a sentence of the form "For many purposes someone with characteristics A, B, and C is more like X than Y". You interrupted after "A" to ask a question that assumes I wrote "For many purposes someone with characteristic A is more like X than Y". This is not the way to have a rational discussion.
(I bet there are in fact contexts in which a convincingly made-up lion should be treated as a tiger. E.g., if you're training a computer vision system. Of course this is far-fetched and irrelevant, but that's what you get for pretending I wrote something I didn't.)
I have tried repeatedly to get you to turn your claims into actual empirical ones and you have so far not obliged, preferring to handwave about "the similarity cluster" even though it's obvious that a key point is that there are different notions of similarity around.
It looks to me as if I have consistently been careful to distinguish between empirical questions, questions of definitions, and questions of what policies to adopt. And if my aim here were to signal as loudly as possible my allegiance to the Blue rather than the Red tribe, I would be responding in a very different way to your repeated use of needlessly provocative terminology. (Which, now that you bring the topic up, looks a lot like signalling your allegiance to a different tribe...)
It would be if I went on to say "... so any notion of similarity is as good as any other", but I didn't and won't because I don't believe that. On the contrary, what I have repeatedly said is that what notion of similarity is best depends on context. There are plenty of possible notions of similarity that would be very bad in any halfway plausible context. It's my opinion that for many purposes a purely anatomical notion of gender-similarity (is that what you favour? I've asked before but you still haven't said) works less well than a more social and psychological one. (Not only because it makes people whose internal sense of their gender and external anatomy differ happier, though that's a bonus. Also because in most interactions perceived gender -- one's own and others' -- makes much more difference than anatomy, chromosomes, hormones, etc.)
What is your evidence for that? Anyway, I wasn't referring only to this case (I take it you mean Jenner's) but asking generally: do you really think that trans people are generally deluded about what anatomy they have, how strong they are, whether they are biologically capable of bearing children, etc.?
In the case of every trans person I know enough about to tell, the answer is: no, of course they are not deluded about that; they know the answer and hate it. (Or, in some cases: no, they aren't deluded about it; they knew that they didn't have the anatomy that felt right to them, and took steps to make their anatomy more like that, and now it's nearer.)
I think that's what "applying the principle of charity and taking others' claims about how they feel about their bodies at face value" means.
That's not letting people define their own identities but letting experts define their identities. Fluttershy clearly spoke about letting people define their own identities. Don't let yourself get mindkilled because it's a political topic.
I'm suggesting that applying that principle in general doesn't have to mean applying it exactly the same to imprisoned criminals.
(Similarly, I am in general strongly in favour of letting people communicate freely and privately with others, but if we choose to restrict and/or monitor the calls of people in prison then that makes some sense.)
It's intermediate between the two: letting people define their own identities but giving experts a veto in a case where the risk of abuse is especially severe. Again: a general principle of letting people define their own identities may need amendment when dealing with people we have locked up in the name of public safety, just as general principles of free speech and free association and so forth get amended when dealing with those people.
Thanks for the advice. I commend it to all. Do you have a particular reason to think I am getting mindkilled, beyond the fact that (1) I disagreed with you and (2) you think my arguments are weak? (You have disagreed with me and I think "X might have bad consequences if applied unaltered to dangerous criminals, so proposing X in general is wrong" is a terrible argument; should I conclude that you're getting mindkilled?)
Yes, that you fail to distinguish between the question of whether to let people self identify themselves and whether people in hormone therapy really change their gender.
The debate whether or not a XY transexual with no penis, a vagina and big boobs is female or male is a quite different question from the debate whether or not the act of identifying as female means that your gender is female.
I have the impression that the political nature of the subject prevents you from distinguishing the two issues and that you simply want to be pro-LGBT instead of engaging with detailed arguments that distinguish different questions.
Well, I may or may not be mindkilled but I'm certainly confused. The only mention I made of hormone therapy was to suggest that in the special context of prisoners wanting to move to a different prison on account of gender transition, being on hormone therapy might be a useful criterion for being demonstrably serious. (Not for being actually male/female. The point is that it is evidence of the sincerity of the prisoner's claim, which we need because in this situation insincere claims might otherwise be a problem.)
So far as I can see,
simply hasn't come up in this discussion, or at least not the bit of it you and I have been engaging in. Accordingly, I have no idea how anything I've written can suggest that I'm failing to distinguish that debate from any other debate. I also don't think the question was ever quite
although obvious that isn't a mile from what Fluttershy was saying.
So it looks to me as if there's a failure of communication here. Let me attempt to say clearly and explicitly what I think the issues are. My apologies for the length of what follows.
Well, you're entitled to your impression. I confess I'm unsure how you got it. In particular, I don't see that you made any such detailed arguments; in fact, the principal point of my original comment was that you failed to distinguish between "what should we do in general?" and "what should we do for the more difficult and dangerous case of imprisoned criminals?".
I think the situation is a going to become bit more difficult if we confine out attention to the cases where gender/sex matters. Just declaring yourself to be a male/female/lizard overlord/banana is nothing particularly exciting and is likely to lead to shrugs or, at most, some eye-rolling. But once you demand some rights as a member of that particular group, the situation becomes much muddier.
As you point out, there are "plenty of exceptions" to the my-gender/sex-is-whatever-I-say approach. The interesting question is whether most circumstances where gender/sex matters turn out to be such "exceptions".
A very reasonable question, but note that for a lot of transgender people gender matters to them even when nothing very dramatic rides on it. They want to be addressed as Alice rather than Alex, to wear women's clothes, and so forth, without being laughed at (or worse) for it, and even if those don't look to the rest of us like "circumstances where gender/sex matters" I'm pretty sure it's a different story when you're looking at it from the inside.
There are rights that accrue to people of one sex but not of the other (to play in one sports team rather than another; to use one bathroom rather than another; ...) but I'm really pretty sure no one goes through the angst and nuisance and embarrassment of gender transition so that they can use a different bathroom.
Wow, this discussion really took off! I mainly replied to VoiceOfRa's comment in order to encourage people to be nice to trans people in general, rather than to advocate any highly specific and well-thought-out position.
Yes, your idea of what constitutes being "nice" to people is problematic to say the least.
In general I do practice the principle of charity on LW in the sense that I think that other people on LW try to advocate well-thought-out positions.
There no reason that there much to be gained by trying to speak on LW for a position in a way that isn't well-thought-out.
Would you apply the same logic to someone who claims Jesus talks to them? What about the person claiming to be Jesus?
On the other hand, there's a lot of hormonal and developmental variation among people, even if a large majority fall into two groups.
You seem to be equivocating on gender and sex (something the list warned you about!). Gender roles are social constructs... so yes, obviously, whatever we do, we will be taking people's (socially approved) "delusions and hallucinations" at face value. Whether you are delusional in believing that "this bathroom is a special place for men" or "dresses are special clothes for women", these delusions are socially perpetuated, and change based on society. So it may happen that (to take the programmer list as an example), on Facebook there are 5 (or 50) socially appropriate genders. It may happen that in the PS bathroom there are two appropriate genders. You can see why taking the PS list as equal to the FB list would be suboptimal :-)
Moreover, it is silly to argue that people seeking to change the social order by claiming a third gender are as insane as people that we would commonly define as delusional and hallucinating... So I assume that you are using bombastic language to grab our attention. Is your argument actually that you feel bad about social change, and want us to stop doing it?
That's because the distinction doesn't actually exist. In particular, to the extent gender refers to a real concept and not an pure XML tag, it refers to what is commonly called sex.
Most of them are nothing more than ways for narcissists to signal their special-snowflakeness.
Yes, the optimal solution would be for the FB list to match the PS list.
Since you appear to be new here, let me explain the local social norms. Around here people are expected to provide arguments for their positions. In case you're not aware repeating the opponents possession prefaced with "it is silly to argue" is not an argument.
Okay... People who are seeking to change social norms in general are not usually considered insane in the same way as someone who is making claims that their sensory input is showing them something different from everyone else.
For example, social norms would not allow women to walk topless outside except in exceptional situations, even where it is legal. This is often a problem... for example, even the edge case breastfeeding mothers are marginalized; more generally, bare-chested women as a class are marginalized. Changing this social norm would require changing gender norms. Generally, advocating for this change is acceptable, although not always respectable.
However, I do not think that you really care about gender norms. I think that you are specifically worried that adding further gender categories is a form of pandering to people who want to increase static without increasing signal; that is, the information that someone does not identify as traditionally female does not appear to be useful information to you, and therefore you view this as needless static.
Let me know if I am wrong.
However, if we are looking at domain knowledge as something worth exploring to allow you to interact with other people, as in the examples given for coders, you can see how awareness of this could be very important. After all, many people of non-standard genders feel more strongly about those identities than they do about religion, so you might reasonably view a basic knowledge of these views as equally important as knowing the basics of major religions.
If you are uncomfortable with this, you might simply avoid people who identify with non-standard genders. However, I would suggest that you can more profitably communicate with people of non-standard genders than with people who are hallucinating.... However, my personal sample size of interactions with people who are hallucinating/delusional in a psychological sense is fairly small, so I could be wrong.
That can fall under the "exceptional situation" exemption when there is a reasonable reason for them to be breast feeding in public.
There's a very simple solution for them: cover up their breasts. I don't see why this is a problem.
That would require that the "domain knowledge" be actual knowledge and not BS.
Surely it does. One is a classification system based on biology, the other is a cultural template determined by the local culture.
You can argue that they match most of the time, or even that they should match all the time, but in contemporary usage the words "sex" and "gender" clearly have distinct meaning.
There are two things here, if we care to stick to the discussion of edge cases (which is theoretically the point of this thread...)
The first is sex, in which case we should be talking about things like Turner's syndrome and XYY syndrome; sex is not binary. It is only usually binary.
The second would be coming up with a definition of gender, and seeing if it matches our definition of sex. It is safe to say that 1) the use of 'gender' to mean the same as 'sex' is within the usual range of common usage, and 2) completely wrong under certain 'domains' (sociology, anthropology, a number of personal vocabularies, etc.).
This seems to be saying that those domains are making a mistake in making this distinction -- something that is hard to defend without knowing something of those domains. This is particularly hard to defend without making very strong definitions, and it is very hard to get strong definitions that we will agree on.
Yes, and nearly all those cases do in fact cluster with one of the two "standard" genders. And the very rare exception to this are generally not the people who are claiming to be "transsexual".
You can come up with whatever definition you want, I don't see why I should are about IffThen!gender.
This is an interesting claim. Things that are often lumped into 'gender' includes things like dress, pronouns, and bathrooms, and these things are very important to people. Maybe they shouldn't be, but they are.
You are very unclear as to what you are suggesting. One obvious interpretation is that caring if you wear a dress or a tie is the same as hallucinating, and we should stop doing it. This is an interesting claim... and potentially a very useful one. I would support this. I would also support unisex bathrooms and gender neutral pronouns. So we might not disagree at all.
But it is also possible to interpret your claim as saying that non-standard genders are less valid than standard ones, even when the standard ones are arbitrary or harmful. This is harder to defend -- in fact, no one defends this as a general theory except extreme moral relativists (the claim that 'woman are not worthy to vote' is generally not held to be true based on the culture you are in, but to have a higher reasoning behind arguments for and against; in case it is not obvious, voting was assigned as a gender role; a voting woman would be outside of either standard gender for much of our history). Obviously this is an extreme example, but you can see that gender matters; if in your life you find that the only reason that gender matters is whether or not your bathroom has an urinal or not, this is very good for you.
(It is also possible that you believe that we currently have developed the perfect gender roles, and any change would be a worsening of conditions. This is sufficiently different from my own view that I am not willing to spend my time debating it unless you give me some sort of compelling evidence up front.)
I think that this is sufficient for you to see why I claim that you are equivocating on gender and sex. I'm fairly certain that what you actually want to claim is something much less strong, simply that using made-up pronouns and complaining about what bathroom you are assigned is annoying at best, and perhaps a sign of a personality disorder. In this case, you might want a very different list than the one provided.
Others have already mentioned the benefits of commercial sites pandering to their clients, so I needn't elaborate.
Well they are, although "less valid" is a rather strong understatement.
You do realize that that's a moral claim. In order to evaluate it in a utilitarian framework, one could look at, for example, whether women having the vote leads to better or worse policy outcomes. I think this is certainly a debatable position either way and certainly is far from obvious. Heck it might even depend on other properties of the society.
In other words, my position is outside the range of positions you're used to encountering, and you're desperately hoping I back-peddle so you don't have to think of arguments against it, in the process have to question the axioms of your philosophy.
Partially. You can't just ignore the biological basis and declare gender roles to be arbitrary -- they are not.
True - but in the context of the top post, you can and should be looking at cases where gender roles are non-traditional. After all, this is a post about edge cases and overgeneralized beliefs. Gender roles are an excellent example of arbitrary rules being over applied. This applies both to cases when we are dealing with other members of our own culture, and with members of other cultures.
Not all systems of gender are about individuals asserting their gender. In nonwestern contexts you also have other ideas of gender that are society based.
Meh. I've always thought the gender stuff and many others (not getting into them) are borderline insane, which is why I usually avoid that if possible.
I might be overly cynical but the world runs in it's own way. I'd like to be treated in a certain way but I can hardly blame people for not treating me the way I'd like tp. Nobody owes you anything so you can't ask them to pay their debt. At the end of the day all you can really do is work on yourself and that's it.
I can understand the sentiment, but history has shown that if insanity is not confronted it expends in both power and depth.
The problem is that it's a two-way street. What you see is not what I see, and if person X is claiming A, I myself might be seeing D instead. Reality-wise, we would probably have to check their genes, but that's less practical. So instead people go to their intuition and just call them whatever they think fits.
It's also a pretty big offense to call a woman a man, and vice-versa, so there's still risk in that.
I'm not a programmer, so my view may be a little bit skewed.. but this seems like a list of things that may or may not be correct (and I'd like to put things in a continuum, or percentages, or some other more practically observable other than a list) but it doesn't really get any further than that. How substantial many of the claims are?
I honestly doubt "programmers" get all these wrong. I'm not going to link to a post (I've seen some people replying with a post as if it's a substitute for actually saying what's wrong) or even say that "programmers" is a group too big and perhaps too inclusive to really have anything to say about them. I'll just link to esr's guide on hacking and ask the people who wrote the articles who they were dealing with. I doubt that the "hackers" being talked at esr's guide would do a thing like that. I'd also like to link to the suckless philosophy and ask if the "programmers" and software the writers were dealing with were really what what the suckless philosophy is completely at odds with.
If I ask most programmer or people of other domains whether all months have more than 27 days I think most of them would say, of course all months have more than 27 days. That if wednesday is the second of a month the following friday out to be the 4th of the months.
You actually need to know about the strangeness of september 1752 to know that there this one month in the calender who had less days. It had no days between the 2nd and the 14th.
Children get taught in school that minutes have 60 seconds and not that there a body that decides 18 months in advance whether the minute is supposed to have 59, 60, 61 or 62 seconds.
The september 1752 example sounds like something you'll find on a trivia show. It's not really such a good example. It's the exception rather than the rule. When I read this I feel like I'm back in elementary school being the detail obsessed nerd.
I can't say anything about the minute example but seeing the trend is to take some obscure occurrence, pointing fingers and saying "how can you not know that?" and looking like a special snowflake to every regular person.
In practical terms, what are the merits of all those examples? Going back to the lists, some of them are probably bad design[1], like one example that a backup is a string of numbers 053901011991.html so let's not focus on them.
[1] What constitutes "bad design" may vary; some people could probably easily filter through many files like that using ls. Some people prefer minimalism, others don't feel compelled to use their processing power so sparingly, and would rather get the job done more quickly. (It seems like this has some time implications. If you have cleaner code, you can work with it more easily in the future, if you just want a task done and forget about it) So if I were to describe "bad design" in a way that holds some water, I would say that it hurts productivity.
The whole point of the list is that there are exceptions to rules that most people consider to be true in all cases.
If you program systems than you get bugs because of corner cases that you don't anticipate. You need domain knowledge to know all the corner cases.
Leap seconds manage to crash real world computer systems because their designers didn't handle them properly.
You don't want any software that has a calendar to crash simply because a user asks the system to show september 1752.
Actually, the proper solution is to practice defensive programming, not trust the user input, and be generous with sanity checks. Failing gracefully is much easier when your software knows it's not in Kansas any more.
Which sounds nice right up until a production system shuts itself down gracefully a few hours before a daylights saving time switch purely because of tests which turn out to be more picky than the actual thing they're supposed to be protecting.
Multi-byte characters can do surprising things to scripts designed to truncate logs written by someone who didn't take into account the maximum size of characters and chinese production server names.
A lot of a programmers day can end up being related to fixing bugs due to incorrect assumptions or failing to take edge cases into account and knowing lots of edge cases and handling a reasonable portion of them right away is far better than making the most restrictive possible assumptions off the bat.
You don't want to end up running into the Y2Gay problem: http://qntm.org/gay
Do you know that "the system" can handle that input fine? If you do, why did you sanity check reject it?
Sanity checks are just code -- you certainly can write bad ones. So?
That post argues via mind-numbingly stupid strawmen (or should that be strawschemas?). Yes, you should try to be not stupid, most of the time, to the best of your ability. I agree :-/
This is no different from asking someone the fastest route to get to the store and being told "go a mile down that road and take a left" even though the person didn't check to see if the road was temporarily blocked. If you ask someone directions, they're probably not going to add "unless the road isn't temporarily blocked" and "unless a meteor hit the store last night and I didn't know about it yet" and "unless there's a quantum fluctuation that will move all your molecules right next to the store".
In many cases Google Maps has disclaimers like that.
In programming you usually do care more about edge cases then you care in daily life.
You may be pointing out a problem with English. "Programmers" could simply mean more than one programmer, but there's an implication that all programmers have those problems or perhaps that the problems are pervasive.
I get the impression that these are mistakes that someone has seen (or made) at least once. Some of them may mostly be made by programmers who are beginners.
I agree that it would be nice to get percentages, even if there are large error bars. I think the main point of these lists is to warn programmers that they may need much more specific knowledge than they think they need. For what it's worth, the commenters on those lists are programmers, and I'm not seeing comments which say "That never happens!".
Of course not. Many hackers are programmers, few programmers are hackers. People fitting esr's description are rare and cubicle peons with a keyboard and a screen are legion.
Also, there is a place where the sun rises in the west and sets in the east.
(Gur fha evfrf orpnhfr bs gur Rnegu'f ebgngvba, ohg rira va gur nofrapr bs gur Rnegu'f ebgngvba vg jbhyq evfr naq frg bapr n lrne orpnhfr bs ubj gur Rnegu'f nkvf cbvagf. Vs lbh ner pybfr rabhtu gb gur Abegu Cbyr, gur ebgngvba unf artyvtvoyr pbagevohgvba gb gur fha'f evfvat naq frggvat naq gur fha evfrf naq frgf cerggl zhpu bayl orpnhfr bs gur nkvf. Tb gb gur Abegu Cbyr, frr jurer gur fha evfrf, naq tb njnl sebz gur cbyr n fubeg qvfgnapr va n qverpgvba fhpu gung guvf cbvag vf gb gur jrfg.)
A problem of believing something wrong could also be a problem of classification or problem of language. There is so much lost in translation and as far as a programmer is concerned they deal with a very formal language. So they are not as good at informal languages and nuances.