David_Bolin comments on Open Thread - Aug 24 - Aug 30 - Less Wrong
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I feel like I might understand now. Can I represent your points as follows:
Assuming statement 1 is correct, without accepting a further premise I don't feel compelled to accept the second premise. It sounds like things which are logically impossible may in fact be equivelant to things which don't exist, and vice-versa. And that sounds intuitively compelling. If something was logically possible, it would happen. If it is wasn't possible, it's not going to happen. Or, the agent's modelling of the world is wrong.
Importantly, I don't accept premise 1, as I've indicated in another comment reply (something about how I find I'm wrong about the apparent impossibility of something, or possibility of something.)
I said "so the probability that a thing doesn't exist will be equal to or higher than etc." exactly because the probability would be equal if non-existence and logical impossibility turned out to be equivalent.
If you don't agree that no logically impossible thing exists, then of course you might disagree with this probability assignment.