TheAncientGeek comments on Deliberate Grad School - Less Wrong
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The motivation actually seems to be the Correspondence Theory of Truth..that is mentioned several timesin subsequent comments.
Indeed, even though when you use a Lossy-Correspondence/Compression Theory of Truth, abstract objects become perfectly sensible as descriptions of regularities in concrete objects.
Not really, because most maths is unphysical, ie physics is picking out the physically applicable parts of maths, ie the rest has nothing to correspond to.
If I remember my Lakoff & Núñez correctly, they were arguing that even the most abstract and un-physical-seeming of maths is constructed on foundations that derive from the way we perceive the physical world.
Let me pick up the book again... ah, right. They define two kinds of conceptual metaphor:
Their argument is that for any kind of abstract mathematics, if you trace back its origin for long enough, you finally end up at some grounding and linking metaphors that have originally been derived from our understanding of physical reality.
As an example of the technique, they discuss the laws of arithmetic as having been derived from four grounding metaphors: Object Collection (if you put one and one physical objects together, you have a collection of two objects), Object Construction (physical objects are made up of smaller physical objects; used for understanding expressions like "five is made up of two plus three" or "you can factor 28 into 7 times 4"), Measuring Stick (physical distances correspond to numbers; gave birth to irrational numbers, when the Pythagorean theorem was used to prove their existence by assuming that there's a number that corresponds to the length of the hypotenuse), and Motion Along A Path (used in the sixteenth century to invent the concept of the number line, and the notion of a number as lying between two other numbers).
Now, they argue that these grounding metaphors, each by themselves, are not sufficient to define the laws of arithmetic for negative numbers. Rather you need to combine them into a new metaphor that uses parts of each, and then define your new laws in terms of that newly-constructed metaphor.
Defining negative numbers is straightforward using these metaphors: if you have the concept of a number line, you can define negative numbers as "point-locations on the path on the side opposite the origin from positive numbers", so e.g. -5 is the point five steps to the left of the origin point, symmetrical to +5 which is five steps to right of the origin point.
Next we can use Motion Along A Path to define addition and subtraction: adding positive numbers is moving towards the right, addition of negative numbers is moving towards the left, subtraction of positive numbers is moving towards the left, and subtraction of negative numbers is moving towards the right. Multiplication by a positive number is also straightforward: if you are multiplying something by n times, you just perform the movement action n times.
But multiplication by a negative number has no meaning in the source domain of motion. You can't "do something a negative number of times". A new metaphor must be found, constrained by the fact that it needs to fit the fact that we've found 5 * (-2) = -10 and that, by the law of commutation (also straightforwardly derivable from the grounding metaphors), (-2) * 5 = -10.
Now:
So in other words, we have taken some grounding metaphors and built a new metaphor that blends elements of them, and after having constructed that new metaphor, we use the terms of that combined metaphor to define a new metaphor on top of that.
While this example was in the context of an obviously physically applicable part of maths, their argument is that all of maths is built in this way, starting from physically grounded metaphors which are then extended and linked to build increasingly abstract forms of mathematics... but all of which are still, in the end, constrained by the physical regularities they were originally based on:
To take a step back. the discussion is about mathematical Platonism, a theory of mathematical truth which is apparently motivated by the Correspondence theory of truth. That is being rivaled by another theory, also motivated by CToT, wherein the truth-makers of mathematical statements are physical facts, not some special realm of immaterial entities. The relevance of my claim that there are unphysical mathematical truths is that is an argument against the second claim.
Lakoff and Nunez give an account of the origins and nature of mathematical thought that while firmly anti-Platonic doesn't back a rival theory of mathematical truth, because that is not in fact their area of interest..their interest is in mathematical thinking.
Who said that? Actual formal systems run on a coherence theory of truth: if the theory is consistent (and I do mean consistent according to a meta-system, so Goedel and Loeb aren't involved right now), then it's a theory. It may also be a totally uninteresting theory, or a very interesting theory. The truth-maker for a mathematical statement is just whether it has a model (and if you really wanted to, you could probably compile that into something about computation via the Curry-Howard Correspondence and some amount of Turing oracles). But the mere truth of a statement within a formal system is not the interesting thing about the statement!
Who said that CToT motivates mathematical Platonism, or who said that CToT is the outstanding theory of mathemtaical truth?
I couldn't agree more that coherence is the best description of mathematical practice.
This one.
Or rather, who claimed that the truth-makers of mathematical statements are physical facts?
Insofar as logic consists in information-preserving operations, the non-physically-applicable parts of math still correspond to the real world, in that they preserve the information about the real world which was put into formulating/locating the starting formal system in the first place.
This is what makes mathematics so wondrously powerful: formality = determinism, and determinism = likelihood functions of 0 or 1. So when doing mathematics, you get whole formal systems where the theorems are always at least as true as the axioms. As long as any part of the system corresponds to the real world (and many parts of it do) and the whole system remains deterministic, then the whole system compresses information about the real world.
Whereas the physically inapplicable parts don't retain real-world correspondence. Correspondence isn'ta n intrinsic, essential part of maths.