JoshuaZ comments on Against Discount Rates - Less Wrong

23 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 21 January 2008 10:00AM

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Comment author: JoshuaZ 16 March 2011 09:15:29PM 7 points [-]

I don't think the human brain's equivalent to a utility function is unbounded. Dopamine levels and endorphin levels are limited - and it seems tremendously unlikely that the brain deals with infinities in its usual mode of operation. So, this is all very hypothetical.

This doesn't have much to do with my preferences. I might experience the same level of negative emotion when thinking about Busy Beaver (10) people being tortured as opposed to Busy Beaver(1000) people being tortured, but I still have a preference for which one I'd like if I have to choose between the two.

Comment author: timtyler 16 March 2011 10:12:15PM -2 points [-]

Some mechanism in your (finite) brain is still making that decision.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 16 March 2011 10:23:59PM * 3 points [-]

Some mechanism in your (finite) brain is still making that decision.

Sure. But I can express a preference about infinitely many cases in a finite statement. In particular, my preferences includes something like the following: given the existence of k sentient, sapient entities, and given i < j <= k, I prefer i entities getting tortured to j entities getting tortured assuming everything else is otherwise identical.

Comment author: timtyler comment score below threshold [+] (13 children)

Comment author: benelliott 16 March 2011 11:16:47PM * 5 points [-]

Think about it this way:

Omega comes up to you and offers you a choice, it will kill either n or 2n people depending on what you ask. When you ask what n is Omega explains that it is an integer, but is unfortunately far too large to define it within your lifetime. Would you not still pick n in this dilemma? I know I would.

This isn't quite enough to prove an unbounded utility function, but if we slightly modify the choice so it is n people die with certainty versus 2n people die with 99.999% probability and nobody dies with 0.001% probability then it is enough.

Comment author: timtyler comment score below threshold [+] (11 children)

Comment author: JGWeissman 16 March 2011 11:42:11PM 2 points [-]

The function would go: lots-of-death bad, not-so-much-death not so bad.

Try using numbers. If you try to bound the function, there will be a sufficiently large n where you will prefer the 99.999% probability of 2n people dying to 100% of n people dying.

Comment author: timtyler 16 March 2011 11:47:42PM * -2 points [-]

To recap, I objected: "your brain can't handle those numbers". To avoid the huge numbers, they were replaced with "n" - and a bizarre story about an all-knowing being. If you go back to the numbers, we are back to the first objection again - there are some numbers that are too big for unmodified humans to handle. No, I can't tell you which numbers - but they are out there.

Comment author: CuSithBell 17 March 2011 12:45:32AM * 4 points [-]

The grandparent is a reductio of your assertion (and thus, if you agree that "not-so-much-death is not so bad", a disproof). You seem to be questioning the validity of algebra rather than retracting the claim. Do you have a counterargument?

I'd suggest that you may be able to argue that the brain does not explicitly implement a utility function as such, which makes sense because utility functions are monstrously complex. Instead, the brain likely implements a bunch of heuristics and other methods of approximating / instantiating a set of desires that could hypothetically be modeled by a utility function (that is unbounded).

Comment author: timtyler 17 March 2011 01:08:15AM 0 points [-]

The grandparent is a reductio of your assertion (and thus, if you agree that "not-so-much-death is not so bad", a disproof). You seem to be questioning the validity of algebra rather than retracting the claim. Do you have a counterargument?

"your brain can't handle those numbers" wasn't "questioning the validity of algebra". It was questioning whether the human brain can represent - or even receive - the large numbers in question.

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JoshuaZ comments on Against Discount Rates - Less Wrong

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