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Bugmaster comments on Circular Altruism - Less Wrong
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Isn't this a reductio of your argument? Stealing $10,000,000 has less economic effect than stealing $100,000, really? Well, why don't we just do it over and over, then, since it has no effect each time? If I repeated it enough times, you would suddenly decide that the average effect of each $10,000,000 theft, all told, had been much larger than the average effect of the $100,000 theft. So where is the point at which, suddenly, stealing 1 more cent from everyone has a much larger and disproportionate effect, enough to make up for all the "negligible" effects earlier?
See also: http://lesswrong.com/lw/n3/circular_altruism/
It seems like you and Hul-Gil are using different formulae for evaluating utility (or, rather, disutility); and, therefore, you are talking past each other.
While Hul-Gil is looking solely at the immediate purchasing power of each individual, you are considering ripple effects affecting the economy as a whole. Thus, while stealing a single penny from a single individual may have negligible disutility, removing 1e9 such pennies from 1e9 individuals will have a strong negative effect on the economy, thus reducing the effective purchasing power of everyone, your victims included.
This is a valid point, but it doesn't really lend any support to either side in your argument with Hul-Gil, since you're comparing apples and oranges.
I'm pretty sure Eliezer's point holds even if you only consider the immediate purchasing power of each individual.
Let us define thefts A and B:
A : Steal 1 cent from each of 1e9 individuals. B : Steal 1e7 cents from 1 individual.
The claim here is that A has negligible disutility compared to B. However, we can define a new theft C as follows:
C: Steal 1e7 cents from each of 1e9 individuals.
Now, I don't discount the possibility that there are arguments to the contrary, but naively it seems that a C theft is 1e9 times as bad as a B theft. But a C theft is equivalent to 1e7 A thefts. So, necessarily, one of those A thefts must have been worse than a B theft - substantially worse. Eliezer's question is: if the first one is negligible, at what point do they become so much worse?
I think this is a question of ongoing collateral effects (not sure if "externalities" is the right word to use here). The examples that speak of money are additionally complicated by the fact that the purchasing power of money does not scale linearly with the amount of money you have.
Consider the following two scenarios:
A). Inflict -1e-3 utility on 1e9 individuals with negligible consequences over time, or B). Inflict a -1e7 utility on a single individual, with further -1e7 consequences in the future.
vs.
C). Inflict a -1e-3 utility on 1e9 individuals leading to an additional -1e9 utility over time, or B). Inflict a one-time -1e7 utility on a single individual, with no additional consequences.
Which one would you pick, A or B, and C or D ? Of course, we can play with the numbers to make A and C more or less attractive.
I think the problem with Eliezer's "dust speck" scenario is that his disutility of option A -- i.e., the dust specs -- is basically epsilon, and since it has no additional costs, you might as well pick A. The alternative is a rather solid chunk of disutility -- the torture -- that will further add up even after the initial torture is over (due to ongoing physical and mental health problems).
The "grand theft penny" scenario can be seen as AB or CD, depending on how you think about money; and the right answer in either case might change depending on how much you think a penny is actually worth.