AlexanderRM comments on Circular Altruism - Less Wrong
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Thank you for trying to address this problem, as it's important and still bothers me.
But I don't find your idea of two different scales convincing. Consider electric shocks. We start with an imperceptibly low voltage and turn up the dial until the first level at which the victim is able to perceive slight discomfort (let's say one volt). Suppose we survey people and find that a one volt shock is about as unpleasant as a dust speck in the eye, and most people are indifferent between them.
Then we turn the dial up further, and by some level, let's say two hundred volts, the victim is in excruciating pain. We can survey people and find that a two hundred volt shock is equivalent to whatever kind of torture was being used in the original problem.
So one volt is equivalent to a dust speck (and so on the "trivial scale"), but two hundred volts is equivalent to torture (and so on the "nontrivial scale"). But this implies either that triviality exists only in degree (which ruins the entire argument, since enough triviality aggregated equals nontriviality) or that there must be a sharp discontinuity somewhere (eg a 21.32 volt shock is trivial, but a 21.33 volt shock is nontrivial). But the latter is absurd. Therefore there should not be separate trivial and nontrivial utility scales.
A better metaphor: What if we replaced "getting a dust speck in your eye" with "being horribly tortured for one second"? Ignore the practical problems of the latter, just say the person experiences the exact same (average) pain as being horribly tortured, but for one second.
That allows us to directly compare the two experiences much better, and it seems to me it eliminates the "you can't compare the two experiences"- except of course with long term effects of torture, I suppose; to get a perfect comparison we'd need a torture machine that not only does no physical damage, but no psychological damage either.
On the other hand, it does leave in OnTheOtherHandle's argument about "fairness" (specifically in the "sharing of burdens" definition, since otherwise we could just say the person tortured is selected at random). Which to me as a utilitarian makes perfect sense; I'm not sure if I agree or disagree with him on that.