All security is through obscurity. Obscurity of a bitting pattern, of a private key, of a password, of an algorithmic optimization strategy.

That phrase, and the sneer encoded in it, does have some wisdom, but it's more complex than "If you're relying on obscurity you're doing it wrong", being a criticism of a much more specific fault than relying on obscurity, which is, after all, the only thing that has ever worked. That criticism is this: Suppressing knowledge of security faults provides only a false sense of security in a system whose faults thus are held unknown to everybody except those with the strongest specific interest in possessing knowledge of those faults. Which is to say, if your strategy to a security fault is to hide it, rather than fix it, you're setting yourself up for failure later.

But that is all moot, because my suggestion had more in common with bypassing a lock than in protecting one. Secrecy is desired because of something most like other people's poor security, and the desire they not improve it.