gjm comments on The Number Choosing Game: Against the existence of perfect theoretical rationality - Less Wrong

-1 Post author: casebash 29 January 2016 01:04AM

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Comment author: gjm 05 January 2016 06:16:16PM 5 points [-]

Very closely related: Stuart Armstrong's Naturalism versus unbounded (or unmaximisable) utility options from about three years ago.

I think all this amounts to is: there can be situations in which there is no optimal action, and therefore if we insist on defining "rational" to mean "always taking the optimal action" then no agent can be perfectly "rational" in that sense. But I don't know of any reason to adopt that definition. We can still say, e.g., that one course of action is more rational than another, even in situations where no course of action is most rational.

Comment author: casebash 05 January 2016 11:36:12PM 0 points [-]

"We can still say, e.g., that one course of action is more rational than another, even in situations where no course of action is most rational." - True.

"But I don't know of any reason to adopt that definition" - perfect rationality means to me more rational than any other agent. I think that is a reasonable definition.

Comment author: evand 29 January 2016 04:23:58AM 0 points [-]

Seeing as this is an entire article about nitpicking and mathematical constructs...

perfect rationality means to me more rational than any other agent. I think that is a reasonable definition.

Surely that should be "at least as rational as any other agent"?

Comment author: casebash 29 January 2016 10:24:52PM 0 points [-]

Thanks for this comment. I agree, but can't be bothered editing.