timtyler comments on Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality - Less Wrong

64 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 31 January 2008 07:36PM

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Comment author: Eoghanalbar 03 September 2010 05:03:04AM 1 point [-]

Ha! =]

Okay, I DO expect to see lots of 'people are crazy, the world is mad' stuff, yeah, I just wouldn't expect to see it on something like this from the kind of people who work on things like Causal Decision Theory! :P

So I guess what I really want to do first is CHECK which option is really most popular among such people: two-boxing, or predictably choosing box B?

Problem is, I'm not sure how to perform that check. Can anyone help me there?

Comment author: timtyler 03 September 2010 07:32:58AM *  0 points [-]

I think this is the position of classical theorists on self-modifiying agents:

From Rationality, Dispositions, and the Newcomb Paradox:

I conclude that the rational action for a player in the Newcomb Paradox is taking both boxes, but that rational agents will usually take only one box because they have rationally adopted the disposition to do so.''

They agree that agents who can self-modify will take one box. But they call that action "irrational". So, the debate really boils down to the definition of the term "rational" - and is not really concerned with the decision that rational agents who can self-modifiy will actually take.

If my analysis here is correct, the dispute is really all about terminology.