CarlShulman comments on Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality - Less Wrong
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That is going for the third option and dodging to point out exactly why the problem should not be well posed. I can write a program working as the Newcomb's problem is described if I go for the "unperfect predictor" version where the being is merely right "most of the time". A way to do it could be to let player run a number of practice (or calibration) games, then at a time chosen by the guesser make that game "real". The calibration plays would simulate the supernatural player minute observation of the player behavior, what can indeed not easily be done.
I knew of the Robust Coopearation paper, and it's really very interresting, but getting the source code of the other is also a huge change to the initial problem. At least it excludes perfect oracles from the problem, it is also clear you may be confronted to halting problem (this is why current scheme tournament based on this idea had to make a provision in rules to avoid non halting programs). Stating we can say something usefull on another problem does not implies the initial one had anything wrong.
On the other hand, it is obvious that Dominance Argument is broken in Newcom's problem (and also in PD) as the logical proof is only correct when we have non correlated variables (non correlation should not be confused with causal independance, causal independance is not enough for Dominance Argument to be correct). In Newcomb's problem, the perfect correlation is part of the problem statement. How anyone could then apply Dominance Argument is beyond me, probably because it mimics usual deductive logic.
I'm not saying that Newcomb's problem describe any physically possible event, or not even that it is a good problem, or that the consequences it leads to are agreeable (at first sight it leads to lack of free will), but just that mathematically using (very) simple probabilistic tools you can solve it, without changing anything and that alternative usual solution is based on a mathematical error.
No good, then even CDTers are incentivized to one-box, since once-boxing in the practice rounds causes higher rewards in the real rounds.
I do not see your reasoning here ? What I'm proposing is not letting know when practising round stops and real round starts. That means indeed that one boxer would get higher rewards in both practice and real round, and that's why I believe it's an argument for one boxing.
My proposal for "simulating" Newcomb's may not be accurate (and it's certainly not perfect) but you can't conclude that based on the (projected) outcome of the experiment disagreeing with wath you expect.
Because depending on the numbers in the setup your modified experiment doesn't get at the disagreement between one-boxer and two-boxers.
Here is an actual program (written in python) implementing the described experiment. It has two stages. The first part is just calibration intending to find out if the player is one boxing or two boxing. The second is a straightforward non iterated Newcomb problem. Some randomness is used to avoid the player to exactly know when calibration stops and test begin, but calibration part does not care at all if it will predict the player is a one boxer or a two boxer it is just intended to create an actual predictor behaving as described in Newcomb's.