Newcomb's Problem is silly. It's only controversial because it's dressed up in wooey vagueness. In the end it's just a simple probability question and I'm surprised it's even taken seriously here. To see why, keep your eyes on the bolded text:

Omega has been correct on each of 100 observed occasions so far - everyone [on each of 100 observed occasions] who took both boxes has found box B empty and received only a thousand dollars; everyone who took only box B has found B containing a million dollars.

What can we anticipate from the bolded part? The only actionable belief we have at this point is that 100 out of 100 times, one-boxing made the one-boxer rich. The details that the boxes were placed by Omega and that Omega is a "superintelligence" add nothing. They merely confuse the matter by slipping in the vague connotation that Omega could be omniscient or something.

In fact, this Omega character is superfluous; the belief that the boxes were placed by Omega doesn't pay rent any differently than the belief that the boxes just appeared at random in 100 locations so far. If we are to anticipate anything different knowing it was Omega's doing, on what grounds? It could only be because we were distracted by vague notions about what Omega might be able to do or predict.

The following seemingly critical detail is just more misdirection and adds nothing either:

And the twist is that Omega has put a million dollars in box B iff Omega has predicted that you will take only box B.

I anticipate nothing differently whether this part is included or not, because nothing concrete is implied about Omega's predictive powers - only "superintelligence from another galaxy," which certainly sounds awe-inspiring but doesn't tell me anything really useful (how hard is predicting my actions, and how super is "super"?).

The only detail that pays any rent is the one above in bold. Eliezer is right that one-boxing wins, but all you need to figure that out is Bayes.

EDIT: Spelling