but some of them characteristically do better than others.

A fair point, though I would be interested to hear how the algorithm described in DT relate to action (it can't be that they describe action, since we needn't act on the output of a DT, especially given that we're often akratic). When the metaethics sequence, for all the trouble I have with its arguments, gets into an account of free will, I don't generally find myself in disagreement. I've been looking over that and the physics sequences in the last couple of days, and I think I've found the point where I need to do some more reading: I think I just don't believe either that the universe is timeless, or that it's a block universe. So I should read Barbour's book.

Thanks, buy the way for posting that DT series, and for answering my questions. Both have been very helpful.

Does that make more sense?

It does, but I find myself, as I said, unable to grant the premise that statements about the future have truth value. I think I do just need to read up on this view of time.