= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
ike comments on Newcomb versus dust specks - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (104)
Well it depends on what procedure omega uses: you can't change the procedure and assert the same result obtains! If they predict you by simulating you, that creates a causal dependence, but not if they predict you by your genes or similar. You're not accounting for the causal relationship in your comparison.
In the lesion case, I am assuming that the lesion has 100% chance of causing you to make a certain decision. If that is not assumed, we are not discussing the situation I am talking about.
So the causal process is like this:
I just simulated the lesion process by thinking about it. Omega does the same thing; the details of 2 are irrelevant, as long as we know that the lesion will cause a thought process that will cause smoking.
Sure.
The details of 2 is irrelevant, but the details of how Omage works are relevant. If Omega checks for the lesion, then your choice has no counterfactual causal effect on Omega. If Omega simulates your mind, then your choice does have a counterfactual causal effect.
Lesion -> thought process -> choice.
TDT says choose as if you're determining the outcome of your thought process. If Omega predicts from there, your optimal choice differs from when Omega predicts from Lesion.
So you're saying that if Omega predicts from your thought process, you choose one-boxing or not smoking, but if Omega predicts directly from the lesion, you choose two-boxing or smoking?
I don't see how that is relevant. The description I gave above still applies. If you choose one-boxing / not smoking, it turns out that you get the million and didn't have the lesion. If you choose two-boxing / smoking, it turns out that you don't get the million, and you had the lesion. This is true whether you followed the rule you suggest or any other. So if TDT recommends smoking when Omega predicts from the lesion, then TDT gives the wrong answer in that case.
Well as I said above, this ignores causality. Of course if you ignore causality, you'll get the EDT answers.
And if you define the right answer as the EDT answer, then whenever it differs from another decision theory you'll think the other theory gets the wrong answer.
None of this is particularly interesting, and I already made these points above.
When you say, "this ignores causality," do you intend to make the opposite statements?
Do you think that if a lesion has a 100% chance to cause you to decide to smoke, and you do not decide to smoke, you might have the lesion anyway?
No. But the counterfactual probability of having the lesion given that you smoke is identical to the counterfactual probability given that you don't smoke. This follows directly from the meaning of counterfactual, and you claimed to know what they are. Are you just arguing against the idea of counterfactual probability playing a role in decisions?
"Counterfactual probability", in the way you mean it here, should not play a role in decisions where your decision is an effect of something else without taking that thing into account.
In other words, the counterfactual you are talking about is this: "If I could change the decision without the lesion changing, the probability of having the lesion is the same."
That's true, but entirely irrelevant to any reasonable decision, because the decision cannot be different without the lesion being different.
So all you're doing is denying CDT and asserting EDT is the only reasonable theory, like I thought.
I'm denying CDT, but it is a mistake to equate CDT with Eliezer's opinion anyway. CDT says you should two-box in Newcomb; Eliezer says you should one-box (and he is right about that.)
More specifically: you assert that in Newcomb, you cause Omega's prediction. That's wrong. Omega's prediction is over and done with, a historical fact. Nothing you can do will change that prediction.
Instead, it is true that "Thinking AS THOUGH I could change Omega's prediction will get good results, because I will choose to take one-box, and it will turn out that Omega predicted that."
It is equally true that "Thinking AS THOUGH I could change the lesion will get good results, because I will choose not to smoke, and it will turn out that I did not have the lesion."
In both cases your real causality is zero. In both cases thinking as though you can cause something has good results.