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hairyfigment comments on Morality of Doing Simulations Is Not Coherent [SOLVED, INVALID] - Less Wrong
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I deny the parent's second paragraph. (In a nitpicky sense this is trivially false; you could do simulations by kidnapping people and taking over their brains, or by writing calculations on them using knives.)
And of course I did notice your first point, but I deny that we should leap from there to the conclusion of no consciousness. I don't know that I believe it in your scenario; I'm only going along with it because you wanted to assume it with effective-certainty, and you (implausibly) claimed that part wasn't essential to your argument.
Pick some simulation that you are sure definitely has the attribute of "no consciousness" you want to defend (e.g. fill the whole data with a regular checked pattern).
Then pick some simulation that I'm doing that you don't like.
Interpolate all situation between them with a continuous parameter from 0 to 1.
At which point does the "no consciousness" attribute disappear?
The fact that consciousness admits of degrees is verified whenever you go to sleep, or at least when you incorporate external stimuli into a dream. Highway hypnosis seems like another good example.
You say you're already doing the simulation. Interpolations couldn't tell you anything new about what happens within said simulation. Now, there are nevertheless reasons to wonder if they contain consciousness or otherwise add to the problem. But what we know is that you already simulated torture. I need not have a full answer to every philosophical question in order to object.
Thank you!
Indeed my line of thought was incorrect.
The information-theoretic approach + admitting fractional levels of consciousness neatly solves what seemed paradoxical to me.
I edited the article to reflect this update.