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mwengler comments on The map of p-zombies - Less Wrong

6 Post author: turchin 30 July 2016 09:12AM

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Comment author: mwengler 11 September 2016 11:00:46PM *  0 points [-]

if we adopt idea that consciousness could be different without any physical difference between the copies, we adopt the idea of p-zombies and reject physicalism that is modern version of materialism. It almost the same as to say that immaterial soul exist. It is very strong statement.

Not relevant to the problem. If you create a copy of me, the copy is not identical, if for no other reason than it occupies a different location than I do. I agree that if it occupied the same location that I do, atom for atom and quark for quark, that could lead to the concern you express. But copies cannot occupy the same location, and so there is no problem having the copy to the left be one consciousness while the original to the right is a different consciousness.

The strongest claim I might accept would be that both the original and the copy have "valid" claims to be the continuation of the pre-copying single consciousness that was me back then. But no matter how you slice it, killing the original when you make the copy is still destroying a separate consciousness, even if the remaining consciousness thinks it is the only continuation of the pre-copy consciousness.

Comment author: turchin 13 September 2016 08:22:51AM 0 points [-]

If we adopt criteria of identity based of same location, next-moment-of-me will be not me, as I move, Earth move etc. It results in situation where I will die every millisecond.

We could also imagine situation where Omega put my copy in my location, but instantly moves me to the next room.

Comment author: mwengler 11 January 2017 03:52:43PM 0 points [-]

Clearly we can differentiate between different-location-same-time and different-location-different-time. Two things in different-location-same-time are different things. Two things different-location-different-time may be same thing or may be different thing depending on the path through time. Your mathematical style of abstraction in thinking about identity will only be useful at explaining the real world if it is matched to real world processes, and does not ignore important real world insights.

Comment author: turchin 11 January 2017 05:24:07PM 0 points [-]

In fact my goal was to get rid of mathematical definitions of identity and move to instrumental definition. That is the definition of identity depends of the goal I am solving and identity itself is not a thing that actually exists but a supportive term. That is why we have problems this it.

Basically, there is two types of question where we need notion of "identity":

1) What I will experience in the next moment? (first-eye view) 2) Is it the same person? (third-eye view)