Comment author:DanArmak
12 October 2016 02:55:20PM
3 points
[-]
Without commenting on whether this presentation matches the original metaethics sequence (with which I disagree), this summary argument seems both unsupported and unfalsifiable.
No evidence is given for the central claim, that humans can and are converging towards a true morality we would all agree about if only we understood more true facts.
We're told that people in the past disagreed with us about some moral questions, but we know more and so we changed our minds and we are right while they were wrong. But no direct evidence is given for us being more right. The only way to judge who's right in a disagreement seems to be "the one who knows more relevant facts is more right" or "the one who more honestly and deeply considered the question". This does not appear to be an objectively measurable criterion (to say the least).
The claim that ancients, like Roman soldiers, thought slavery was morally fine because they didn't understand how much slaves suffer is frankly preposterous. Roman soldiers (and poor Roman citizens in general) were often enslaved, and some of them were later freed (or escaped from foreign captivity). Many Romans were freedmen or their descendants - some estimate that by the late Empire, almost all Roman citizens had at least some slave ancestors. And yet somehow these people, who both knew what slavery was like and were often in personal danger of it, did not think it immoral, while white Americans in no danger of enslavement campaigned for abolition.
I'm getting really sick of this claim that Eliezer says all humans would agree on some morality under extrapolation. That claim is how we get garbage like this. At no point do I recall Eliezer saying psychopaths would definitely become moral under extrapolation. He did speculate about them possibly accepting modification. But the paper linked here repeatedly talks about ways to deal with disagreements which persist under extrapolation:
In poetic terms, our coherent extrapolated volition is our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together; where the extrapolation converges rather than diverges, where our wishes cohere rather than interfere; extrapolated as we wish that extrapolated, interpreted as we wish that interpreted. (emphasis added)
Coherence is not a simple question of a majority vote. Coherence will reflect the balance, concentration, and strength of individual volitions. A minor, muddled preference of 60% of humanity might be countered by a strong, unmuddled preference of 10% of humanity. The variables are quantitative, not qualitative.
(Naturally, Eugine Nier as "seer" downvoted all of my comments.)
The metaethics sequence does say IMNSHO that most humans' extrapolated volitions (maybe 95%) would converge on a cluster of goals which include moral ones. It furthermore suggests that this would apply to the Romans if we chose the 'right' method of extrapolation, though here my understanding gets hazier. In any case, the preferences that we would loosely call 'moral' today, and that also survive some workable extrapolation, are what I seem to mean by "morality".
One point about the ancient world: the Bhagavad Gita, produced by a warrior culture though seemingly not by the warrior caste, tells a story of the hero Arjuna refusing to fight until his friend Krishna convinces him. Arjuna doesn't change his mind simply because of arguments about duty. In the climax, Krishna assumes his true form as a god of death with infinitely many heads and jaws, saying, 'I will eat all of these people regardless of what you do. The only deed you can truly accomplish is to follow your warrior duty or dharma.' This view seems plainly environment-dependent.
Comment author:Bound_up
15 October 2016 12:40:06PM
0 points
[-]
No, you're totally right.
I've simplified it a bit for the sake of brevity and comprehension of the central idea, but yeah, it's probably right to say that humans are all born with ABOUT the same morality equation. And also true that psychopaths' equation is further away than most's.
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Comments (32)
Without commenting on whether this presentation matches the original metaethics sequence (with which I disagree), this summary argument seems both unsupported and unfalsifiable.
I'm getting really sick of this claim that Eliezer says all humans would agree on some morality under extrapolation. That claim is how we get garbage like this. At no point do I recall Eliezer saying psychopaths would definitely become moral under extrapolation. He did speculate about them possibly accepting modification. But the paper linked here repeatedly talks about ways to deal with disagreements which persist under extrapolation:
(Naturally, Eugine Nier as "seer" downvoted all of my comments.)
The metaethics sequence does say IMNSHO that most humans' extrapolated volitions (maybe 95%) would converge on a cluster of goals which include moral ones. It furthermore suggests that this would apply to the Romans if we chose the 'right' method of extrapolation, though here my understanding gets hazier. In any case, the preferences that we would loosely call 'moral' today, and that also survive some workable extrapolation, are what I seem to mean by "morality".
One point about the ancient world: the Bhagavad Gita, produced by a warrior culture though seemingly not by the warrior caste, tells a story of the hero Arjuna refusing to fight until his friend Krishna convinces him. Arjuna doesn't change his mind simply because of arguments about duty. In the climax, Krishna assumes his true form as a god of death with infinitely many heads and jaws, saying, 'I will eat all of these people regardless of what you do. The only deed you can truly accomplish is to follow your warrior duty or dharma.' This view seems plainly environment-dependent.
No, you're totally right.
I've simplified it a bit for the sake of brevity and comprehension of the central idea, but yeah, it's probably right to say that humans are all born with ABOUT the same morality equation. And also true that psychopaths' equation is further away than most's.