You said:
That only helps if your "rationalist community" in fact pushes you to more accurate reasoning... in my experience the "rationalist community" is mostly that in name only.
I find this claim unsettling, since the rationalist community aggressively promotes an unusual set of epistemic norms (e.g. lots of reliance on logic and numeracy, on careful scrutiny of sources and claims, a trade in debunking explanations) which appear to me to be unusually good at producing true beliefs. You presumably have experience with these norms (e.g. you read stuff Eliezer writes, you sometimes talk to at least me and presumably other rationalists, you are sometimes at rationalist parties), and seem to be rejecting the claim that these norms are actually truth-promoting.
I certainly agree that we don't have the kind of evidence that could decisively settle the question to an outsider, and I think skepticism is reasonable. The main reason someone would be optimistic about the rationalists is by actually looking at and reasoning about rationalist discourse. You seem to have done this though, so I read your comment as a strong suggestion that this reasoning is not very weighty given the absence of a track record that might provide more decisive evidence.
the rationalist community aggressively promotes an unusual set of epistemic norms
Unusual..? How unusual do you think these epistemic norms would be to someone from hard sciences? Or even to, say, a civil engineer?
You keep on setting a low bar. It's really not that hard to be better than the average.
appear to me to be unusually good at producing true beliefs
True beliefs are at best an intermediate, instrumental goal. What you need to do is be good at producing desirable outcomes in reality, not inside your own head.