Yes, I've read the post you mention. But since you didn't fully spell it out, I'm not sure what you're intending to say. I can think of at least two interpretations, one I would disagree with, and one I would agree with.
1) You might be saying that it is impossible to do what I am suggesting given the way people actually relate to words. In this case I would disagree, and I also suspect that you would not apply such a principle consistently, e.g. to speaking about the gender of trans people.
2) You might simply be saying that doing what I am proposing has an epistemic cost. In that case I would agree. For example, take someone who is raised believing in God. He might think, "God is the principle or principles most responsible for the world." Understood in that way, God might very well be the laws of nature or something like that. But if the person previously believed that God was a person, then continuing to speak in that way will make him tend to think "as if" the world was caused by a person, even if he specifically denies it. I agree with that, but have two things to say about it:
First, for such a person, saying that "God does not exist," also has an epistemic cost. Because this will tend to make him think "as if" there were no principles responsible for the world. It is not obvious which cost is worse. Personally I think that "there are no principles responsible for the world" is falser than "a person is responsible for the world," even though both are false. Of course you can respond that you simply don't accept the false thing: but that is possible whether you speak the one way or the other.
Second, there are non-epistemic costs and benefits, and you have to consider these when you consider which way to speak. This is why I brought up the tribal issue: even if the epistemic cost of speaking of God as something existing is higher than speaking as an atheist, it might turn out (at least for people who are members of some communities) that overall the cost of saying that God does not exist is higher.
You can compare this with reading fiction. There can be no reasonable doubt that reading fiction has an epistemic cost, and that in general it will lead you to think "as if" reality were more like the story than it is. But reading fiction can also have epistemic benefits, and it definitely has non-epistemic benefits, so that most people believe (as I do) that the overall benefits outweigh the costs.
Impossible overstates it. It is sufficiently difficult as to not be worth using it, making things more difficult than they have to be. This, again, relates to clarity. If there are people who need unclarity, that's a strategic concern, not one of understanding things as they are.
In the case of God, I think "God does not exist" is sufficiently obvious. People aren't going to stop expecting the universe to behave consistently because they realized "God does not exist" is probably true. As such, they have effectively distinguished God f