Based on our rational approach we are at a disadvantage for discovering these truths.
Is that a bad thing?
Because lotteries cost more to play than the chance of winning is worth, someone who understands basic probability will not buy lottery tickets. That puts them at a disadvantage for winning the lottery. But it gives than an overall advantage in having more money, so I don't see it as a problem.
The situation you're describing is similar. If you dismiss beliefs that have no evidence from a reference class of mostly-false beliefs, you're at a disadvantage in knowing about unlikely-but-true facts that have yet to become mainstream. But you're also not paying the opportunity cost of trying out many unlikely ideas, most of which don't pan out. Overall, you're better off, because you have more time to pursue more promising ways to satisfy your goals.
(And if you're not better off overall, there's a different problem. Are you consistently underestimating how useful unlikely fringe beliefs that take lots of effort to test might be, if they were true? Then yes, that's a problem that can be solved by trying out more fringe beliefs that take lots of effort to test. But it's a separate problem from the problem of "you don't try things that look like they aren't worth the opportunity cost.")
Because lotteries cost more to play than the chance of winning is worth, someone who understands basic probability will not buy lottery tickets.
Whereas as someone who understands advanced probability, particularly the value/utility distinction, might.
...The situation you're describing is similar. If you dismiss beliefs that have no evidence from a reference class of mostly-false beliefs, you're at a disadvantage in knowing about unlikely-but-true facts that have yet to become mainstream. But you're also not paying the opportunity cost of trying out many
I would like to explore certain kinds of experiential knowledge that appear to me to be difficult to investigate rationally as the rational attitude itself might be the cause of a reluctance to explore. If this is already covered in one of the articles on the site please refer me to it.
In this thought experiment we will use the example of lucid dreaming. Lucid dreaming is a state in which a person realises they are dreaming while they are dreaming. The subtleties of the state are not relevant to this discussion.
Circumstances
[1] We will assume the experiment takes place at a time where the existence of the experience of lucid dreaming hasn't been scientifically proven yet. We will also assume that a proof is not possible in the current state of technological or methodological development.
[2] Person A has a (true) belief on the existence of lucid dreaming that is based on his personal experience of the state.
[3] He is trying to communicate the existence of lucid dreaming to someone else. Let us call him person B.
[4] Actually becoming lucid in a dream is quite a complex process that requires among other things1:
[4.1] Expending large amounts of effort.
[4.2] Following guidelines and exercises that appear strange.
[4.3] A time investment of significant length.
In the described circumstances we have an internal experience that has not be scientifically proven but is nevertheless true. We know this in our time through scientific studies but B does not know it in his world. Person B would have to actually believe in the existence of lucid dreaming and trust A to guide him through the process. But since there is no sufficient evidence to support the claim of A, the required effort is significantly large and the methods appear strange to those not understanding the state how can B rationally decide to expend the effort?
Proposed Conclusion
[5] People focusing on rational assessment can be mislead when dealing with experiential knowledge that is not yet scientifically proven, is not easily testable and has no obvious external function but is, nevertheless, experientially accessible.
1 Even if you disagree with the level of difficulty or the steps required please accept [4] and its sub-headings as being accurate for the duration of the argument.