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paper-machine comments on Probability is in the Mind - Less Wrong
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Comments (186)
As I understand it, EY's commitment to MWI is a bit more principled than a choice between soccer teams. MWI is the only interpretation that makes sense given Eliezer's prior metaphysical commitments. Yes rational people can choose a different interpretation of QM, but they probably need to make other metaphysical choices to match in order to maintain consistency.
Aumann's agreement theorem.
assumes common priors, i.e., a common metaphysical commitment.
The metaphysical commitment necessary is weaker than it looks.
This theorem (valuable though it may be) strikes me as one of the easiest abused things ever. I think Ayn Rand would have liked it: if you don't agree with me, you're not as committed to Reason as I am.
Except that isn't what I said.
If MWI is wrong, I want to believe that MWI is wrong. If MWI is right, I want to believe MWI is right.
I believe he's saying that rational people should agree on metaphysics (or probability distributions over different systems). In other words, to disagree about MWI, you need to dispute EY's chain of reasoning metaphysics->evidence->MWI, which Perplexed says is difficult or dispute EY's metaphysical commitments, which Perplexed implies is relatively easier.
That's interesting. The only problem now is to find a rational person to try it out on.