The premises of Pascal's wager are normally presented as abstract facts about the universe - there happens to (maybe) be a god, who happens to have set up the afterlife for the suffering of unbelievers.
But, assuming we ever manage to distinguish trade from extortion, this seems a situation of classical extortion. So if god follows a timeless decision theory - and what other kind of decision theory would it follow? - the correct answer would seem to be to reject the whole deal out of hand, even if you assume god exists.
Or, in other words, respond to a god that offers you heaven, but ignore one that threatens you with hell.
They usually don't have any way to leverage their models to increase the cost of not buying their product or service though; so such a situation is still missing at least one criterion.
There is a complication involved since its possible to increase the cost to others of not doing business with you in "fair" ways. E.g. the invention of the fax machine reduced effective demand for message boys to run between office buildings, hence increasing their cost and the operating costs of anyone who refused to buy a fax machine.
Though I don't believe any company long held a monopoly on the fax market, if a company did establish such a monopoly in order to control prices that again may be construed as extortion.
Modern social networks and messaging networks would seem to be a strong counterexample. Any software with both network effects and intentional lock-in mechanisms, really.
And honestly, calling such products a blend of extortion and trade seems intuitively about right.
To try to get at the extortion / trade distinction a bit better:
Schelling gives us definitions of promises ... (read more)