You have misunderstood the argument completely. You say "I know I'm speaking from limited experience, here. But based on my limited experience, the Zombie Argument may be a candidate for the most deranged idea in all of philosophy." Melodrama, this, but I would advise focusing on the first part of the phrase ("But based on my limited experience....") if you want to make progress.

The main point of the zombie argument is that if science is so completely helpless that it can say nothing -- even in principle -- about the subjective phenomenology of consciousness (and by widespread consensus, this appears to be the case), then the possibility of a parallel universe in which that particular aspect is missing (i.e. the Zombie universe) cannot be ruled out. This Can't-Rule-It-Out aspect is what Chalmers is deploying.

He is NOT saying that we should believe in a parallel zombie universe (a common misunderstandinga among amateur philosophers), he is saying that IF science decides to do a certain kind of washing-its-hands on the whole phenomenology of consciousness idea THEN it follows that philosophers can declare that it is logically possible for there to be a parallel universe in which the thing is missing. It is that logical entailment that is being exploited as a way to come to a particular conclusion about the nature of consciousness.

Specifically, Chalmers then goes on to say that the very nature of subjective phenomenology is that we have privileged access to it, and we are able to assert its existence in some way. It is the conflict between privileged access and logical possibility of absence, that drives the various zombie arguments.

But notice what I said about science washing its hands. If science declares that there really is absolutely nothing it can say about pure subjective phenomenology, science cannot then try to have its cake and eat it too. Science (or rather you, with remarks like "I think I speak for all reductionists when I say Huh?") cannot turn right back around and say "That's preposterous!" when faced with the idea that a zombie universe is conceivable. Science cannot say:

a) "We can say NOTHING about the nature of subjective conscious experience, and
b) "Oh, sorry, I forgot: there is one thing we can say about it after all: it is Preposterous that a world could exist in which subjective conscious experience did not exist, but where everything else was the same!"

Your misunderstanding comes from not appreciating that this is the conundrum on which the whole argument is based.

Instead, you just fell into the trap and tried to use "Huh!?" as a scientific response.

Finally, in case the point needs to be explained: why does the "Huh!" response not work? Try to apply it to this parallel case. Suppose you are trying to tell whether there is a possibility of a liar faking their emotions. You know: kid suspected of stealing cookies, and kid cries and emotes and pleads with Mother to believe that she didn't do it. Is it logically possible for the kid to give a genuine-looking display of innocence, while at the same time being completely guilty inside? If all liars had an equal facility with this kind of fake emotion, would philosophers be justified in saying that it is nevertheless LOGICALLY POSSIBLE for there to be all the outward signs of innocence, but with none of the internal innocence?

According to your approach, you could just simply laugh and say "Huh?", and then declare that "the Fake-Innocence Argument may be a candidate for the most deranged idea in all of philosophy."