The following paragraph from the article is not a sound argument against epiphenomenalism.

If you can close your eyes, and sense yourself sensing—if you can be aware of yourself being aware, and think "I am aware that I am aware"—and say out loud, "I am aware that I am aware"—then your consciousness is not without effect on your internal narrative, or your moving lips.

The above argument is conflating a you, some kind of agent which can cause thinking, moving lips, etc. with consciousness which does not necessarily have any agency. As I understand it, modern neurological research has some pretty convincing evidence that there is no you controlling the show.

If consciousness has no agency, then that is consistent with epiphenomenalism. Perhaps, substituting “consciousness” for “you” where you” is either stated or implied will make it clearer.

If consciousness can close eyes, and consciousness can sense consciousness sensing—if consciousness can be aware of consciousness being aware, and conscious can think "I am aware that I am aware"—and consciousness can say out loud, "I am aware that I am aware"—then consciousness is not without effect on internal narrative, or moving lips.

The above argument simply asserts if consciousness can cause thinking or saying, then it affects the physical world, which is a tautology, because thinking and saying are physical phenomena. In order to provide argue against epiphenomenalism, you would have to show that consciousness can cause thinking or saying.