To prevent the other worlds from being real enough to have people inside them,

In RQM, there are no other worlds in the MWI sense. MWI allows observers to make contradictory measurements, such as |up> and |down> and then tries to remove the contradiction by indexing each measurement to its own world. rQM does not allow observers to make contradictory measurements, so there is no need to wish away worlds, because there was never a need to introduce them.

"However, the comparison does not lead to contradiction because the comparison is itself a physical process that must be understood in the context of quantum mechanics. Indeed, O′ can physically interact with the electron and then with the l.e.d. (or, equivalently, the other way around). If, for instance, he finds the spin of the electron up, quantum mechanics predicts that he will then consistently find the l.e.d. on (because in the first measurement the state of the composite system collapses on its [spin up/l.e.d. on] component). That is, the multiplicity of accounts leads to no contradiction precisely because the comparison between different accounts can only be a physical quantum interaction. This internal self-consistency of the quantum formalism is general, and it is perhaps its most remarkable aspect. This self consistency is taken in relational quantum mechanics as a strong indication of the relational nature of the world." --SEP

we need to insist very loudly that this whole diagram of what is 'real relative to' other things, is not itself real. I

rQM has an ontology. It's an ontology of relations. rQM denies state -- non-relational infmoration. rQM does not need to say anything is real relativee to anything else -- only that some information is not available to some systems.

Also, since only individual points in configuration space allow one particle to say that another particle is in an exact position and have this be 'real', if you take a blob of amplitude large enough to contain a person's causal process, you will find that elements of a person disagree about what is real relative to them...

I have no idea what that means.

My best guess at the lack of agreement here is the difference in yours and mine ontology at a rather basic level. Specifically, your ontology seems to be

Since my expectations sometimes conflict with my subsequent experiences, I need different names for the thingies that determine my experimental predictions and the thingy that determines my experimental results. I call the former thingies 'beliefs', and the latter thingy 'reality'.

whereas mine does not have "the thingy that determines my experimental results" and treats these results as primitive instead. As a consequence, everything is a model ("belief"), and good models predict experimental results better. So there is no need to use the term "real" except maybe as a shorthand for the territory in the map-territory model (which is an oft useful model, but only a model).

You can probably appreciate that this ontological difference makes statements like

since only individual points in configuration space allow one particle to say that another particle is in an exact position and have this be 'real', if you take a blob of amplitude large enough to contain a person's causal process, you will find that elements of a person disagree about what is real relative to them...

where the term "real" is repeated multiple times, lose meaning if one only cares about making accurate models.

Now, I cannot rule out that your ontology is better than my ontology in some sense of the term "better" acceptable to me, but that would be a discussion to be had first, before going into the interpretational problems of Quantum Mechanics. I can certainly see how adopting your ontology of objective reality may lead one to dislike RQM, which evades pinning down what reality is in the RQM view. On the other hand, you can probably agree that removing objective reality from one's ontology would make MWI an unnecessary addition to a perfectly good model called relational quantum mechanics.

Basic question I probably should've asked earlier: Does shminux::RQM entail not-MWI?

If the answer is "no" then shminux::RQM is indeed plausibly shutting up, since by adding further information we can arrive at MWI. I plead guilty to failing to ask this question, note that shminux failed to volunteer the information, and finally plead that I think most RQMers would claim that theirs is an alternative to MWI.

I think what EY is saying is that, rQM entails MWI, and only an extra layer of epistemological interpretation denies the reality to the worlds. ie, he thinks MWI says "QM implies many worlds" whereas rQM says "QM implies many worlds, but we should just ignore that". (One man's ontological minimalism is another man's epistemological maximism).

But that's all based on a sequence of misunderstanings. rQM doesn't allow observers to make contradictory observations AND there is no observer-indepenent world-state in rQM, so there are no multiple world-states in rQM.